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 7 
Introduction 
The post Cold War age reveals itself as being characterized 
mostly by the flourishing of “identity politics”. Identitary issues 
affect the public dimension of collective life and they often 
develop into economic, legal, political terms. There are many 
types of collective identity. We would clarify some of them in 
order to focus the analytical tools that are necessary to face the 
phenomena we are interested with: national and regional 
identities. Crucial in our argument are the concept of “political 
identity” and its “territorial” dimension. 
This concept and this dimension consent to compare Nation-
State and (sub-national) region as space of collective life, and their 
“authoritative” degree; they consent to consider the regional 
claims in front of Nation-State as well as the persistent primacy of 
the latter as a system structuring “political territory” and the 
modern democracy. Remind the “deep reasons” of the Nation-
State historical success as structuring system of political life helps 
us to understand its contemporary strength and value in front of 
the usually weakness of the challenger-region. These reasons deal 
with the politics of identity, at least as much as with the power 
and the monopoly of the legitimated use of the force. Moreover, 
during the international terrorism crisis that exploded on 
September 11 and the economic crisis of the past few years, the 
centrality of the Nation-State has forcefully re-emerged: for 
example, in the economic-financial, military, public-security and 
migration fields. The Nation-State has once again shown itself to 
be a solid political construct, as well as being flexible and with 
abundant resources not readily available to the other sorts of 
political organization (super-national or sub-national or even ones 
of other kinds) that compete with it and challenge its political 
primacy, sometimes seeking to erode its sovereignty. 
Understanding the factors that underlie the political persistence of 
the Nation-State requires focusing on the political nature of this 
kind of collective life organization and going beyond its reduction 
to a pure administrative, legal, and economical apparatus. It also 
requires addressing the issue of the collective identity and the 
distinctive political-identitary model which the Nation-State has 
been able to give itself through a centuries-long process. 
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According to this subject, this essay will treat the following 
points: the return of identity politics nowadays (section 1); the 
concept of collective identity (section 2); the many faces of 
collective identity (section 3); the relationship among politics, 
territory and identity, analyzed through the paradigmatic case of 
Nation-State and national identity (section 4); the structuring of 
political space between centre and peripheries, where we consider 
how the dominance of Nation-State model has to face persisting 
of territorial cleavages (section 5); the case of the regional issue 
(section 6); the final parts deal with the “strength” and the “value” 
of Nation-State (sections 7 and 8), and try to show how and why 
the Nation-State survival and resurgence are linked with the 
identitary-territorial dimension of politics that still characterizes 
contemporary world.  
1. The flourishing of identity politics today 
1989 marked the demise and the de-freezing of the geopolitical 
structure characteristic of the “Cold War” period. Some view 1989 
as the end of the “short century” [Hobsbawm 1994], others link 
that date to the beginning of the globalization era [see e.g. Beck 
1997], while yet others view globalization as the “end of history” 
[Fukuyama 1992]. Interpreted in this way, 1989 was a 
misunderstanding (an illusion to some, a nightmare to others). 
On looking beyond the ideological pretensions of neo-
liberalism1, we see that the waning of communism, the 
liberalization of the exchange economy, and the revolution in 
communication technologies, have not unified the world; nor 
have they homogenised the patterns and practices of social and 
political life. And history continues to move forward. It does so 
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the presumed integration of 
economic and political systems and the uniformity of cultural 
patterns, as well of ideological and religious attitudes, have mostly 
involved the West, to which other areas of the world have 
remained alien or hostile (East, South and especially the partially 
                                                     
1 For a brief description of neoliberalism and its success see Lee Mudge [2008]; for a 
more critical point of view see Harvey [2005].  
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territorialized Islamic world) [see Barber 1995; Huntington 1996]. 
Secondly, the West’s tendency towards globalization within its 
own borders combines with a tendency towards “fragmentation” 
[see e. g. Clark 1997], with a post-modern localism or even the 
persistence of a traditional localism [see Sassen 2007]. In the post-
1989 world the drives for fragmentation manifest themselves in a 
variety of processes: social-economic and cultural diversification, 
territorial localization of corporations and global circuits of 
techno-communications, continuous political and territorial 
fragmentation and re-composition (on inter-State, intra-State and 
cross-border levels). Federalism, regionalism, secessionism, 
communitarianism, nationalism and micro-nationalism (often of a 
religious or ethnic nature): these notions, in different ways, 
describe a world that is neither unified nor kept in peace by the 
action of a new global order; they instead characterize a divided 
world in which unrest is overt, sometimes violent sometimes 
simmering. Finally, the opposing dynamics of globalization and 
fragmentation “put history on the move again” and prove to be 
sources of tension for the Nation-State – that is, for the model 
and experience of political-cultural organization that has been the 
absolute protagonist on the historical stage for the centuries since 
the beginning of the modern age. The Nation-State established 
itself as the primary spatial delimitation and institutional regulation 
system for internal and international processes regarding 
economic, power, legitimization and collective belonging. 
Globalization and fragmentation both challenge this fundamental 
pillar of Western modernity. But instead of being dead or 
obsolete, the Nation-State has reacted robustly to such super-
national and sub-national pressures2. 
Within this framework, the “post-cold war age” is 
characterized mostly by the flourishing of “identity politics” [see 
Touraine 1997; Castells 1997; Maalouf 1998; Friedman 1999; 
Girad 2001; Benhabib 2002; Apter 2003; Bauman 2003; Hall 2008; 
Todorov 2008; Moisi 2009; Ollivier 2009]. The identification of an 
individual with one group rather than another, self- and hetero-
recognition of collective identities, identity opposition between 
                                                     
2 This is also recognized by an analysis in many respects critical of the continuing 
centrality of the Nation-State in the contemporary age: see Sassen [2007]. 
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groups: these are the main factors that fill politics with “identitary 
issues” in the modern and “post-modern” world. As has been 
argued, in the contemporary world it is group identity that counts 
most: the country, the religious or ethnic group, the race, the 
“nation of sexual preferences” [see Friedman 1999]. 
In its collective manifestation, the “identitary fact” assumes 
forms that are micro as well as macro-social, pacific as well as 
violent. Today identitary politics involves, for example, gender 
distinction policies or the rights of homosexuals, redefinition of 
“couple”, “family”, parent (father, mother), the treatment of 
minorities, or legislation on sensitive issues concerning ethics and 
religion (assisted procreation, euthanasia, the cloning of human 
cells). They also concern the definition and defense of the “local 
cultures” included or excluded from citizenship, the inter-ethnic 
or multiculturalist relations on communitarian bases, the 
universalism of human rights, globalism, Occidentalism, Islamism, 
laicism, patriotism, economic protectionism; or, again, the ethnic 
and religious conflicts, the “ethnic cleaning”, the “clash of 
civilizations”, the humanitarian interventions, and so on. The 
importance of “identity” can be explained by the fact that 
identitary questions do not have only a historical-literary 
importance, perhaps of interest to a cultured elite: they have 
existential and social reverberations on the everyday lives of both 
individuals, groups and institutions. Identitary issues affect the 
public dimension of collective life and they often develop into 
economic, legal, political questions. The identity issue, in 
particular as regards collective identity, has become increasingly 
important for policy-makers [see Friedman 1999]. 
In recent years, in particular, the “brave new world” which 
many analysts envisaged after 19893 has became somewhat 
obsolete because of the rise of identity politics (or the identitary 
dimension of politics). The vision of a peaceful and harmonic 
world collapsed, lastly, with the September 11 attacks, the wars 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq, or it slid into destructive international financial crises and 
                                                     
3 In Kissinger view, instead, it has been the spread of international terrorism and the 
wars of the beginning of the twenty-first century to mark the end of the international 
system born with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. See H. Kissinger, interview, “La Stampa”, 
8 may 2003. 
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their social consequences, into anti- or new-global movement 
protests. The presumed primacy of the functional dimension has 
declined. In this context, it is to consider with attention the idea 
that the problems of collective life are no longer reducible to 
technical, economic or legal problems. Politics and its identitary 
rootedness have returned. To better understand such 
developments, that is contemporary politics and our social life, 
political and social sciences have to drive their attention to the 
“political culture” dimension of the society. As it will become 
clear in the following pages, this essays is a theoretical and 
interpretative contribution in this direction. 
Actually, the image of a “new world” unified and pacified on 
the basis of the primacy of economic principles of free global 
trade, juridical globalism and the universalism of human rights was 
criticized as soon as it emerged from the fall of the Berlin Wall 
[see Dahrendorf, Furet, Geremek 1992; Brzezinski 1993]. In 
particular, Samuel Huntington’s well-known thesis expressed 
more forcefully than others a different interpretation of the 
principles regulating politics and the international system after the 
Cold War4. But Huntington’s thesis has often been discussed 
from partial or equivocal points of view. Its critics and supporters 
have mainly discussed the persuasiveness of the claim that it is the 
destiny of civilizations to conflict with each other; or the 
plausibility of the contention that one civilization (especially the 
Western one) is superior to others. The more convincing 
arguments provided by Huntington are instead different, and 
more sophisticated.  
First, the idea that the world cannot be considered “unified” 
according to any regulating principle (neither economic, legal, 
ideological, cultural, religious nor political); or rather the idea that 
one unique “universal” civilization does not exist: history and the 
contemporary world exhibit the existence of a variety of 
“particular” civilities. The conception of “civility” (in the singular) 
is typical of a certain vocation to universalism that characterizes 
Western civilisation; but it has several factual limitations and gives 
                                                     
4 See Huntington 1996. Huntington’s thesis obtained great public resonance after the 
2001 Islamist terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the subsequent ones 
in London and Madrid (to refer only to Europe). In the meantime criticisms of 
Huntington’s have increased. See e.g. Courbage, Todd [2007]; Appiah [2006].  
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rise to ethical-political risks or paradoxes (especially when a 
“civilizing mission” encounters the resistance of those who are to 
be civilized)5. An important consequence of the “clash of 
civilizations” thesis is that value systems, social practices, and 
institutions extraneous to a certain civilization are not to be 
classified as barbaric. From this point of view Huntington 
proposes a vision which important currents of classical European 
liberalism used to embrace. He reformulates, in his own way, the 
Weberian thesis of “values polytheism” and opposes it to that of 
“values monotheism”. The possibility of a “clash of civilizations” 
should be located and interpreted within the conceptual 
framework of this “conflict among values”6. Moreover, it does 
not necessarily imply “values relativism”, nor does it necessarily 
exclude the possibility of a “dialogue among civilizations” as well 
as confrontation between values. 
Secondly, and most importantly, Huntington stresses that a 
dimension which many observers used to consider residual is 
today imposing itself to structure the cleavages and the regulatory 
principles of contemporary politics: the cultural or identitary 
(often religious) dimension. “The central theme of this book”, 
Huntington writes, “is that culture and cultural identities, which at 
the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the pattern 
of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War 
world”7. 
This re-definition of the divisional lines and regulation 
principles, from an economic-functional to a cultural-identitary 
level, has created a new context for international system dynamics, 
for the European integration process, and for political life itself 
within the Nation-States. It is no accident that the 1990s 
witnessed the maturation first, and the weakening thereafter, of 
the logic of “governance without government” at an international 
                                                     
5 This issue has been discussed, from different points of view, by Berger, Berger, 
Kellner [1973]; Todorov [1989]; Walzer [1991].  
6 During the twentieth century, this conception was thematized in masterly and 
dramatic manner by Weber. See also Schmitt [1967]. But it was thereafter formulated also 
outside continental European thought: for instance in the political philosophy of Berlin 
[1969]; Walzer [1977]; Hampshire [2000]. On the debate sparked by the events of 11 
September 2001, see the interesting Various Authors [2002]. 
7 Huntington [1996, 20]. For a similar (though less dramatic) interpretation see Smith 
[1995].  
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and intra-national level inspired by relational criteria of an 
economic-functional8. 
Moreover, during the international terrorism crisis that 
exploded on September 11 and the economic crisis exploded over 
the past few years, the centrality of the Nation-State has forcefully 
re-emerged: for example, in the economic-financial, military, 
public-security and migration fields. The Nation-State has once 
again shown itself to be a solid political construct, as well as being 
flexible and with abundant resources not readily available to the 
other sorts of political organization (super-national or sub-
national or even ones of other kinds) that compete with it and 
challenge its political primacy, sometimes seeking to erode its 
sovereignty. Understanding the factors that underlie the political 
persistence of the Nation-State requires focusing on the political 
nature of this kind of collective life organization and going 
beyond its reduction to a pure administrative, legal, and 
economical apparatus. It also requires addressing the issue of the 
collective identity and the distinctive political-identitary model 
which the Nation-State has been able to give itself through a 
centuries-long process. 
In this framework, the issue of national identity is flanked by 
that of regional identity: these are the two types of collective 
identity that are examined here9. But first necessary is brief 
discussion on the concept of collective identity. 
2. On the concept of collective identity: for a re-definition beyond 
misunderstanding 
The concept of identity refers in the first place to a feeling and 
a consciousness of a self that remains itself in face of others and 
notwithstanding change. The formation of identity depends on 
                                                     
8 This logic and these criteria, for example, had driven the process of European 
integration according to the “Maastricht model”. But they revealed their shortcomings at 
the political level (characterized by goals and demands connected with identity). See Nevola 
[2007a]. On the logic of “governance without government” see Rosenau, Czempiel [1992].  
9 Within the frame of the hypothesis of “super-national” European integration 
process, the issue of national identity is also flanked by that of European identity. See 
Nevola [2007a].   
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intricate processes of self-recognition and hetero-recognition. 
Identity, in different words, consists in the form and content of 
the answers to questions like “who am I?” “Who are you?” “Who 
is he/she?” In all these cases we talk, more precisely, about 
“individual identity” – even if it has public or social connotations. 
 However, “we also can, and do, identify ourselves in terms 
that go beyond the self, that link the self with some other entity or 
group”. In this second case, “Identity for most of us means being 
part of a group”10. The concept of “collective identity” refers to 
this phenomenon11. A collective identity reflects the sense of 
belonging to a group, where groups are variable by nature, size or 
other features12. The contemporary social sciences pay particular 
attention to the themes of collective identity and identity 
politics13. Although the expression “collective identity” has 
became familiar even in everyday language, in the social sciences 
its meaning is disputed – at both the explanatory and normative 
levels14. The concept has sometimes been radically questioned in 
cases where it is referred to an extensive “social group”, such as 
the one that we call “society”15. According to more moderate 
critics, however, the concept of collective identity may be 
appropriate, at most, for traditional societies characterized – in the 
current view – by a status of stasis, or by slow and imperceptible 
social change16. In this case, moreover, the collective identity is 
perceived in “essentialist” terms as a typically closed, rigid, 
exclusive identity. In modern and industrial, post-modern or post-
                                                     
10 The quotations are from Friedman [1999, 3].  
11 To be emphasised is that the collective identity is constitutive of individual identity. 
This idea, widespread in the sociological and philosophical tradition, has been relaunched 
in the past thirty years by neo-communitarian political theory. See e.g. Taylor [1989; 1991]; 
MacIntyre [1981]; Sandel [1982; 2009]. For a sociological point of view see Bellah et al. 
[1985]; Seligman [2000]. For a brief survey Nevola [2010].  
12 As in the cases, to cite not the usual ones, of religious sects, groups of football team 
fans, groups of animal rights or vegetarian activists, the families of Mafia victims, mothers 
of desaparecidoses, homosexuals, feminists, etc.  
13 As recently illustrated by e.g. Rost, Stoelting [2005]; Rost [2005]. 
14 These controversies have arisen mainly in sociological theory and anthropology. For 
a survey of the main issues see Gordon, Gergen [1968]; Sciolla [1983]; Rusconi [1984]; 
Pollini [1987]. See also Goffman [1961]; Levi-Strauss [1977]; Pizzorno [1977]; Gallino 
[1982]; Melucci [1982]; Barbano [1983]; Bellah et al. [1985]; for more recent developments 
see Assmann [1992]; Eisenstadt [1993]; Martin [1995]; Castells [1997]; Dubar [2000]; 
Seligman [2000]; Sciolla [2007]; in more political terms de Benoit [2005]; Baechler [2011].  
15 This, for example, is the criticism made by Berger, Luckmann [1966].  
16 As exemplified by Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “cold societies”. 
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industrial societies, these identificationary features are regarded as 
being in constant decline. The consequence, on a theoretical level, 
of these historical transformations of society should be the 
uselessness of “identity language” for the understanding of social, 
cultural and political phenomena in the contemporary world. A 
similar argument has been put forward by Alain Touraine when he 
argues, for example, that “the strength of a society seems to 
increase in line with the slowness of its change and with the ability 
to reproduce its behavioural codes exactly. When we consider the 
most industrialized societies, we may even doubt the utility of the 
notion “society”. We think that such a notion implies the 
existence of a unity and an identity which we can no longer find in 
the reality we are observing”. From this it follows, according to 
Touraine, that “Nowadays… we must get rid of the idea of 
society and, consequently, get rid of any identitary representation 
of social life, recognizing that social reality is nowhere near an 
expression of an essence, an esprit, a will, and that it is nothing 
other than a fragile outcome, only partially coherent and 
constantly changing, of an ensemble of social relational networks 
and networks based on dominance, influence and authority, and 
which imply conflicts, compromises and deviations” [Touraine 
1983, 157 and 157-58; see also Touraine 1992; 1997]. 
On these bases it has been denied that the collective identity is 
a relevant topic for social sciences or a resource for the 
democratic societies of our time, and argued that when collective 
identity re-emerges it is a threat to integration and the functioning 
of democracy. From this perspective the return of collective 
identities is criticized as a regressive, anachronistic or residual 
phenomenon, as an “identity populism” characterized by a strong 
and noxious introduction of “emotive tension” into political 
questions – as happens, for example, with immigration, 
patriotism, micro-nationalism, regional separatism, or religious 
fundamentalism [see Laplantine 1999; Luverà 1999; Remotti 2001; 
2010; Azzariti 2005; Sen 2006]. 
This rejection of “identity language”, I believe, raises 
numerous doubts and seems generally unconvincing. My counter-
argument is based on two main considerations. The first is 
empirical and entails the intellectual duty of taking the persistence 
of identitary phenomena for granted; the second consideration is 
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theoretical-conceptual and suggests that a conception of collective 
identity different from the current one is possible17. In regard to 
the first point I reiterate the observations made in the previous 
section. I shall therefore dwell on the second point. 
A collective identity should not necessarily be understood in 
“essentialist”, naturalist and monolithic terms18. It can be 
conceived as flexible, relational, and open to change and to 
confrontation with “alterity”. This last conception of collective 
identity proves useful for the analysis of contemporary society 
and, under some conditions, coherent with the ethical-political 
values of present-day democracy. To delineate this conception of 
collective identity we can draw on some of Jürgen Habermas’s 
ideas concerning the “complex societies” of the contemporary 
world. A critical revision of them in regard to certain important 
questions can be useful in re-formulating the notion of collective 
identity in light of the theme of interest here. 
In an important essay concerning collective identity, Habermas 
explicitly posits a “language of identities” alongside the “complex 
societies” of our time: that is to say, the modern or post-modern 
societies [see Habermas 1974]. For this reason he passes positive 
judgement on the use of the collective identity concept by 
referring to a large ensemble of individuals (as a society), and not 
just to the social identity of the single individuals that form it. The 
category of “complex societies” obviously also includes the 
liberal-democratic, pluralistic, dynamic and secularized societies of 
our time; besides, the traditional or “cold” societies, characterized 
by immobilization or by a low level of change, are certainly not 
the ones for which social sciences in the 1970s used with 
insistence the paradigm of complexity. 
On this basis, Habermas emphasises first that a complex 
society produces its identity in a peculiar way and the maintaining 
or losing of it depends on the society itself [see Habermas 1974]. 
This argument, developed within the framework of Habermas’s 
theory of “communicative action” [see Habermas 1981; 1992], is 
                                                     
17 I have written elsewhere on normative aspects concerning the political issues of 
“identity reasons” and the “need for collective identity”. See Nevola [1997a; 2003a; 2003d; 
2006; 2007a; 2007b].  
18 For a typology of conceptions of collective identity see Rost, Stoelting [2005]; Rost 
[2005].   
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interesting because it states that the “collective identity” is not a 
“natural entity”, an “essence” that is given in nature and 
definitively so (although in some circumstances it can be 
“represented” as natural)19: it is instead a “product”, a “social 
construct”. The fact that an identity is “constructed” or 
“invented” does not mean, however, that the identity “does not 
exist”, that it is not a “social reality”20: once constructed or 
invented it “exists” as its social, cultural, political effects. 
“Artificial” does not mean “unreal”21. Neither does it follow that 
such an identity is constructible or modifiable, or that it can be 
planned freely, as some studies on the topic suggest. A collective 
identity, in fact, is not simply the direct product of actions that are 
intentional, rational and transparent (individual or collective). It is 
instead the consequence of a blend of social interactions 
(intentional and unintentional), of their social and historical 
sedimentation and condensation, of their “objectification” – 
according to a view in which “methodological holism” helps 
“methodological individualism”22. Within this interpretative 
framework it makes sense, in my view, to argue that a collective 
identity is “a variable product of collective action”23. 
Secondly, Habermas’s conception clarifies the problem of the 
“maintenance” of a collective identity, and it addresses the 
                                                     
19 This does not gainsay the importance of the “naturalistic” conception of collective 
identity. At the level of political culture, or as Bordieu [1996; 2000] puts it, the “political 
field”, this “naturalistic” representation of a collective identity has in fact a political-
strategic purpose: the actors concerned deliberately pursue instrumental ends, thus giving it 
“existence”. This is a socio-cultural and political phenomenon widely analysed in the social 
and political sciences. See e.g. Nevola [1998]; Rost [2005]; Rost, Stoelting [2005]. 
20 This thesis is especially (but not only) widespread in the “post-modern” social 
sciences. See e.g. Brubaker [1996]. But it can be easily rejected by drawing, for instance, on 
the classic sociological theory of Weber and Durkheim and their conceptions, respectively, 
of “culture” and “social representations”. 
21 See, to give just one example, the case of the Mohicans of New England, cited by 
Kertzer [1988].  
22 For analyses of this problem in the theory of society see Winch [1958]; Berger, 
Luckmann [1966]; Habermas [1974]; Eisenstadt [1993]; in the theory of national identity, 
Smith [1986]. On these aspects twentieth-century social sciences and philosophy have often 
argued convincingly, with concepts such as “social fact” (Émile Durkheim), 
“institutionalization” (Max Weber); “form” (Georg Simmel); “self-fulfilling prophecy” 
(William Thomas), “language games” (Ludwig Wittgenstein), “objectivation” (Arnold 
Gehlen); “typification” (Alfred Schütz).  
23 On collective identity as the variable outcome of collective action see e.g. Calhoun 
[1991].  
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problem of change. Success in combining the problem of 
maintenance with that of change in a collective identity is decisive 
for the conception of collective identity of interest here. As in the 
case of the individual identity, Habermas maintains, we can define 
an identity as “collective” (and we can consequently affirm that its 
formation process has succeeded) if it is able to solve the 
problems linked to maintenance amid radical changes that involve 
its structure and its context. In sum, a “successful” collective 
identity is one that enables a society (a “human group”) to remain 
itself despite change. As a “social construct” and because it 
“maintains itself amid change”, the collective identity is 
understood by Habermas as resulting from communicative and 
reflexive (and self-reflexive) processes of “critical learning”: in 
contemporary society identity is possible only in a “reflexive 
form” founded on the awareness of having “equal and general 
chances” to take part in communication processes; in these 
communication processes the identity’s formation takes place as a 
continuous “learning process” [see Habermas 1974]. According to 
Habermas, in particular, the reflexive and communicative process 
is constituted by a texture of social relations that are normatively 
structured and dialogically oriented, and these relations give rise to 
what he calls “rational identity”. 
Finally, this collective identity, produced and maintained 
reflexively and communicatively, has evidently no need to rely on 
“fixed contents”. And yet, as Habermas himself admits, it cannot 
rest on nothing. In fact “it needs to get contents”, these being the 
materials on which the reflexive and communicative processes 
draw when they generate a collective identity [see Habermas 1974; 
2005] (also with selective modalities, I would add)24. 
This conception of collective identity, though is not free of 
ambiguity or weakness, it is fruitful in many respects; in particular 
because it combines, in its own way, two models often treated as 
alternative or opposing patterns of collective identity formation: 
identities seen as socially constructed artefacts and identities seen 
                                                     
24 An important part in this process is played by the mechanisms of the (collective) 
memory and a collectivity’s relationship with its history, including the so-called “politics of 
history”. See Ricoeur [2000]; Assmann [1992]; Zerubavel [2003]; as well as the classic 
studies by Halbwachs [1925; 1950].   
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as precipitated by the sharing of experiences and memories25. But 
in a certain respect that is of importance to us here, Habermas’s 
conception seems to be problematic and fragile: particularly in its 
definition of the logic that underlies the formation, maintenance 
and change of the collective identity of a society or human group. 
Habermas, in fact, conceives such processes and their logic of 
action as relational networks that are merely communicative and 
dialogical-consensual. He considers the formation, maintenance 
and change of collective identity processes to be based on some 
“authenticity” principle or logic whereby a genuine collective will 
expresses itself. In the end, he maintains, this collective will 
coincides with the image of “civil society” and with the idea of 
“deliberative democracy” supposedly extraneous to, or protected 
against, the logics (and institutions) of power and manipulation26. 
The objections that can be raised against this conception are 
that, on the one hand, power and manipulation are themselves 
“communicative”; and, on the other, that relational networks and 
social communication processes are intimately constituted also by 
strategic factors and conflict dynamics: that is, by logics of power 
and manipulation27. In others words, logics of power and 
manipulation are two physiological elements of communication. 
Consequently, the processes that generate collective identity 
cannot be extraneous to power and manipulation. Arguing that 
collective identities are socially built by communicative and reflexive 
means should not induce us forget that manipulation, violence 
and instrumentality are generally and “physiologically” present 
within social relation systems, and within everyday 
communication both private and public. Specifically, these 
elements are intrinsic to the processes whereby a collective 
identity is formed, maintained and changed. This entails 
recognition of the political nature of the mechanisms that culturally 
                                                     
25 This distinction is taken from Smith [1995].   
26 The most updated and mature version of this Habermasian conception, which seeks 
to remedy the shortcomings of the previous one, is in Habermas [1992]. Of course, the 
weaknesses in Habermas’s theory that I have summarized here are most apparent when his 
“discourse” moves from the ethical-normative philosophical level to the sociopolitical-
empirical one. For a critical analysis of the ideal vision of civil society see Nevola [2003b].  
27 See Rusconi [1984]; Nevola [1994b]. On the logic of political manipulation see Riker 
[1986] and, with closer reference to the symbolic dimension, Edelman [1976]; Kertzer 
[1988].  
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structure collective identities28. The reference to power, in 
particular, besides being unavoidable when discussing the 
formation, maintenance and change of a collective identity, makes 
it possible to grasp basic aspects of the distinction between cultural 
and political identity. I shall return to this point later. For the time 
being, I shall continue with discussion of the general concept of 
collective identity. 
A collective identity concerns how we define ourselves: “who 
we are” and “who we are not”. The definition of “us” always 
implies reference to (and comparison with) “others”29. The 
identity principle is indivisible from the otherness principle: there 
is an “us” because there is a “them” or a “you”. Human beings 
organize their lives on the basis of groupings (in the plural) 
defined by highly diverse features (religion, habits, rules, territory, 
descendance, language, etc.). Historically one “single large human 
group” has never existed, and it is very unlikely that one will exist 
in the future30. The collective identity of a group entails the 
existence of a “plurality of groups”, or better recognition of 
“diversity” and the consequent recognition of the differences 
among groups (any nature or value could be attributed to this 
diversity). It does not mean that, in principle, it is impossible to 
talk about “human identity”, referring, for example, to the 
“human condition”, “human rights”, “universal values”, “equality 
among humans”, or to Kant’s “cosmopolitanism”. The relevant 
point is that such notions are insufficient to understand and 
explain how the collective and political life of humans – including 
its ideal-normative dimension – is really organized and how it 
works31. 
The fact that a collective identity constitutes itself by contrast 
and difference vis-à-vis an Other signifies that a group has an 
                                                     
28 For a discussion of these aspects see Nevola [1990; 1998].  
29 Although formulated in a different context and in terms of a radical opposition, Carl 
Schmitt’s (primarly existential more than political) us/them dichotomy is still an important 
contribution on the theme. See Schmitt [1927]; see also Freund [1995]; Mouffe [2005]. 
Ackerman [2004] has recently returned to the “existential” dimension of politics.  
30 Lemberg [1964] has rightly emphasised this aspect.   
31 I would add that the tension between tendencies to the “particularism” and 
tendencies to the “universalism” of identities is inscribed in history and human culture. It is 
an essential feature of European and Western modernity – as Berlin [1990] showed with 
the image of the dialectic between Enlightenment and Romanticism. More in general see 
also Walzer [1991]; Todorov [1989]; Taguieff [1987]; Sternhell [2006]; Jullien [2008].  
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“inside-oriented identity” and an “outside-oriented otherness”. 
This aspect of identity should not be misunderstood or trivialized. 
Firstly, it does not imply that a particular group is totally 
homogenized or integrally characterized by “absolute affinity”, or 
characterized only by identity-homogeneity: differences and the 
consequent plurality are not excluded; they are instead typically 
present within groups. Secondly, and analogously, such an 
argument does not imply that a particular group is characterized 
by absolute extraneousness towards other groups, or characterized 
only by diversity-heterogeneity: shared features and inter-group 
communication are not excluded; indeed, they are typically 
present32. In other words, groups define their collective identities 
on the basis of internal identity elements as well as differences 
from external others; but a group’s identity is usually defined also 
by internal variety and pluralism and by openness to the outside. 
My argument therefore rests on the concepts of intra-group “relative 
affinity” and inter-group “relative otherness”. The former refers to the 
element that prevails within the group; the latter to the element 
that prevails towards the outside of the group: intra-group affinity 
is perceived (by the subjects involved or by an external observer) as 
stronger than inter-group affinity; inter-group otherness is perceived 
as stronger than the intra-group one. The affinity and 
extraneousness factors may also vary in their nature and contents 
as may also vary in the extent of the groups33. 
The identitary system of affinity-extraneousness is clearly inter-
subjective; but it can be seen, both by actors and observers, under 
an “objectivistic” light (as a “social fact”, à la Durkheim) and/or 
under a “subjective” light (as a subjective intention that gives 
sense to social action, à la Weber). The affinity-extraneousness 
identitary system entails “self-identification”34 as “hetero-
                                                     
32 See e.g. Lévi-Strauss [1977]. For a classic sociological analysis of the social relation 
of “otherness” see Znaniecki [1930-31]. Useful political analyses are Horowitz [1985]; 
Kellas [1991]; Linz [1995].  
33 National identity is a paradigmatic case exemplifying the dimensions (economic, 
cultural, political, historical, etc.) around which a collective identity forms. The point has 
been treated widely in the sociological and political science literature on the topic since the 
classic theories of Ernst Renan and Max Weber.  
34 As M. Rainer Lepsius has written, “The premise for the development of an identity 
is the existence of an object that regards itself as a unit, distinct from others, and which 
self-defines itself on this basis”. [Lepsius 1997, 3]. However, Lepsius fails to emphasise the 
crucial factor of hetero-identification.   
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identification”. In regard to self-identification, the (relative) affinity 
of a group means that its members a) have something in common; 
b) are aware that they have something in common; c) are aware 
that one of the things that they have in common is membership 
of the group (belief and sense of belonging and reciprocal 
recognition). Likewise in regard to hetero-identification, the 
(relative) affinity of a group means that its members are recognized 
by other groups’ members as a) having something in common; b) 
being aware of having something in common; c) being aware that 
one of the things that they have in common is belonging to the 
group. On both the self-identification and hetero-identification 
levels, it is the third aspect (the belief and sense of belonging) that 
predominates in the definition of a group and its collective 
identity35. No less important is that none of the three above 
aspects should be considered a fixed starting-point for, or a 
“natural” feature of, the collective identity. Instead, they all 
represent stakes and possible landings in the (relational, 
communicative and reflexive) processes by which identities are 
formed, and in the (political) struggle for identitary recognition36. 
Redefined thus, collective identities “exist” even in 
contemporary developed society – although they are often 
characterized as dynamic, fluid, context-bound, relational, 
negotiated, contested, and reflexive, constantly built and re-built, 
and with problematic borders [see Shore 1993]. They are “belief 
objects”, “networks of symbolic acts” [see Taguieff 1995a].  
                                                     
35 However, more generally, in the theoretical scheme of political unification, the 
dimensions of “identity/membership” and “power/command” are of equal importance for 
political unification: see Nevola [2007a]. A different position is taken, for instance, by 
Michael Walzer, who tends to give priority to the former: “The primary good that we 
distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with 
regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with 
whom we will make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to 
whom we allocate goods and services”. Again: “Admission and exclusion are the core of 
communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. 
Without them, there could not be communities of character, historical stable, ongoing 
associations of men and women with some special commitment to one other and some 
special sense of their common life” [Walzer 1983, 41 and 70]. Here I merely point out that 
the structuring of a political identity also entails a structuring of intra-group and inter-group 
power.  
36 On the “struggle for recognition” see Taylor [1992]; Honneth [1992]; Habermas 
[1993]; Ricour [2000]. See also Pizzorno [1977]; Rusconi [1984]; Nevola [1990].   
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3. The numerous faces of collective identity 
The above-suggested concept of collective identity should be 
specified. Collective identity comes in many guises; that is, it has 
many faces. Some of them should be clarified, albeit with no claim 
to systematicity or exhaustiveness: for the aim here is instead to 
focus selectively on the analytical tools needed to interpret the 
social phenomena of interest: national and regional identity. 
A) A collective identity is cultural (or ethno-cultural) when a 
group’s self- and hetero-identification is based on a series of 
elements which we normally recognize as cultural: language, 
literary and artistic tradition, habits, rules of social behaviour, 
religion, historical memory, various beliefs, myths, rites, symbols, 
etc. 
B) In some cases these identitary elements are shared by a 
group within a delimited territory. Owing to its material, historical 
and symbolic features, this territory become another factor giving 
shape and content to the collective identity. Space becomes the 
object of collective learning, appropriation and feeling. It becomes 
a place dense with historical and symbolic meanings; a space that 
hosts and nourishes the identitary roots of a group and gives 
structure to a privileged “communicative field”. Space and time 
(and culture) meet and merge within this face of collective identity 
consisting in territorial identity. 
C) Finally, a collective identity acquires its guise as political 
identity when the following conditions are satisfied: i) the 
elements that give shape and content to a cultural type of 
collective identity (“territorialized” or otherwise) are sustained by 
power structures and instruments shared by a group; ii) this group 
must recognize itself, and be recognized, as having an explicit and 
shared “command chain” that imposes decisions, choices, and 
sanctions that are authoritative and binding erga omnes within the 
group; iii) the group must decide not to tolerate interference (from 
outside by other groups) in its self-organization of collective 
public life, except interferences which a group allows. This means 
that political identity centres on “force” and produces the 
“compulsory” attitudes and behaviours (“political obligations”) 
[see Tussman 1960; Pitkin 1965-1966; Walzer 1970; Flatman 1972; 
Pateman 1979; Beran 1987] which the group’s members recognize 
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as “legitimate duties” towards the community to which they 
belong. These are loyalty attitudes and behaviours37 whose 
purpose is to defend the group’s integrity, well-being and survival 
when it is subject to threats or problems arising from within or 
without. 
Every collective identity is necessarily a cultural identity; but it 
is not necessarily a territorial or political one. Hence a territorial 
kind of identity has a cultural face but not always a political one; 
likewise, a political kind of identity always has a cultural face but 
not always a territorial one. We may accordingly construct a 
simple typology of collective identities that starts from cultural 
identity and develops through the two dimensions of identitary 
territoriality and politicity. Some ideal-typical forms of collective 
identity emerge from this typology (see schema 1 and schema 2). 
Schema 1. Tipology of collective identities 
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37 On the concept of loyalty in a political community see Grodzins [1956].  
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Schema 2. Some examples of identitary phenomena from the typology 
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The existence of this variety of identitary forms and the fact 
that they do not exclude each other (so that the members of a 
group and the group itself may have many types of identity) raises 
the question of whether a “multiple identity” is possible, and also 
of whether the different types of identity all have the same weight. 
In recent years the notion of a multiple identity has gained much 
importance in social science debates, and it has been often cited to 
relativize the value of the Nation-State as an identitary model on a 
descriptive, explanatory or prescriptive level. I cannot discuss the 
question in its entirety here, but some considerations about the 
shortcomings of the multiple identity perspective are necessary. 
First consideration. It should be borne in mind that the notion 
of multiple identity refers properly to the social identity of single 
individuals, not to the collective identity of a group considered as 
a whole. In this regard, the supporters of the multiple identity 
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thesis often undervalue the difference, in nature and implications, 
between the individual dimension of identity (the identity of an 
individual, included her/his social aspects) and the collective 
dimension of identity (the identity of a group), reaching 
conclusions (mostly in an implicit way) about the latter by taking 
characteristics of the former. They thus produce a conceptual 
short-circuit that leads, in the best scenario, to a view of 
“collectiveness” as the “sum of single individualities”. The 
principal corpus of sociological tradition and fundamental trends in 
political theory oppose this conceptual drift (which has a 
liberalistic, individualistic or postmodernist matrix) with solid 
arguments both theoretical and empirical [see e. g. Bellah et al. 
1985]. Let us now focus on the concept of multiple identity. 
According to Anthony Smith, the fundamental reason why an 
individual is the pertinent referent for the multiple identity is that 
“individual identity” can often be multiple because it is often 
“situational”: “human beings have multiple identities – of family, 
gender, class, religion, ethnic and nation – with one or other at 
different time taking precedence over others, depending on many 
circumstances”. Collective identity is a “pervasive” type of identity 
because at a collective level “is not the options and feelings of 
individuals that matter, but the nature of the collective bonds” 
[Smith 1995, 123 and 124; see also Habeas 1996]. The 
“pervasiveness” of collective identity depends on the nature of the 
common bond. The nature of this bond can be described by 
reformulating a classic idea: the collective identity of a group is 
not the sum of its members identities. In accordance with 
Durkheim’s sociological theory, Smith views collective identity as 
a “social fact”: collective identity becomes “objective”, 
enveloping, external and “coercive” for the individual, and this is 
the result of a socialization and communication process [see also 
Berger, Luckmann 1966].  
This Smith’s argument helps in underlying, on the one hand, 
the difference between individual and collective identity; and on 
the other, the fact that the consistency and characteristics of a 
collective identity cannot be deduced from the pure sum of a 
multitude of individual actors (as we would deduce from an 
ingenuous use and interpretation of public opinion surveys). It is 
within this scheme that Smith modulates and specifies the nature 
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of the common collective identitary bond. But there is another 
point to emphasise concerning the multiple identity; and dealing 
with it can usefully draw on further passages of Smith’s analysis. 
Second consideration. To be emphasised is that the argument 
for a multiple identity proves very weak precisely in circumstances 
where the identitary question is decisive: for example, when the 
different spheres of wide-range or territorial identity (regional, 
national or European) are in tension with each other, or when 
collective loyalty is demanded (as usually happens in critical 
situations like economic crises, a lack of resources, migratory 
waves, or wars). In situations like these, a problem in the 
“management of multiple identities” arises, not just at an 
individual level but at a collective one as well. This observation 
suffices to show that the multiple identity concept should not 
become an easy rhetorical device with which to hide the 
distinctive and exigent nature of a political type of collective 
identity (like the one typically associated with the Nation-State). 
This last consideration highlights another problematic aspect 
which the multiple identity thesis undervalues: if every individual 
is able to cumulate a multiplicity of identities, what are the 
relations among these different identities? Do multiple identities 
have the same capacity to “envelop” and “involve” the 
individuals? What factors play a role in this context? Smith, for 
example, poses the question as follows: “Theoretically ... it would 
be perfectly possible for the people of Europe to feel that they 
had more than one collective cultural identity: to feel themselves 
Sicilian, Italian and European or Flemish, Belgian and European 
(as well as being female, middle class, Muslim or whatever). At the 
same time, it should also be asked: what is the relative strength of 
these ‘concentric circles of allegiance’? Which of these circles is 
politically decisive, which has most effect on people’s day-to-day 
lives? And which of these cultural identities and loyalties is likely 
to be more durable and pervasive?” [Smith 1995, 124]. Smith gives 
clear answers to these questions: as in the past so today, the 
national collective identity still predominates [see e. g. also Thiesse 
1999; Haller 2003]. Smith is likewise unequivocal in identifying the 
factor that, even in the case of multiple identities, makes the 
national identity prevail: it is, once again, culture. More precisely, 
the deep-lying and “mythical” dimension of a culture that works 
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as a mythomoteur, that symbolically transforms collective 
experiences into common values for a people (and thus forms its 
collective identity) [see Smith 1986]. 
Smith’s proposed solution for the problems concerning the 
multiple identity thesis is convincing as regards the supremacy of 
national identity among other extensive and territorial identities, 
but not as regards explanation of the prominence of culture. In 
this regard, I merely point out that this analysis is incomplete 
because it is oriented only to the cultural collective identity and 
neglects the importance of a political collective identity. But the 
political dimension of collective identity is essential when 
discussing the problem of multiple identities and their weight in 
public life. Indeed, when we more generally consider the historical 
formation processes (maintenance and change) of collective 
identities, the dimensions of identity politics, political culture and 
political socialization are extremely important38. The prominence of 
the political dimension of a collective identity is linked to the 
political bonds (loyalty and obligation) that define self- and 
hetero-recognition by a group as political collectiveness in the sense 
defined earlier. 
I have elsewhere sought to delineate a theory of political 
unification [see Nevola 2007a]. This theory highlights that a 
collective identity needs “force” if it is to be a resource for the 
“political unification” of a community; in other words it must be 
backed by power structures and instruments that bind belonging 
and translate identity into loyalty. Only under these conditions can 
a potential political (authoritative) system pass the “political 
unification test”. In other words, the test verifies in this case the 
availability of a political identity and determines the collective 
loyalty (both “vertical” and “horizontal”) that consists in the 
ability to set the “common bond” as binding (political obligation). 
My argument concerning national/regional identity is that is only 
under these conditions, and at this level, that the political-
                                                     
38 Reference to the identitary model of the Nation-State is illuminating in this regard; 
not so much in its specificity as a historical phenomenon and a particular form of political 
unity, but rather insofar as it helps give salience to the general and typical conditions that 
have produced a variety of empirical cases and a successful historical model. For a 
preliminary discussion see Nevola [2001a; 2007c].On the concept of political identity see e. 
g. Mac Kenzie [1978]. 
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identitary primacy of the Nation-State has historically manifested 
itself and continues to do so today. This kind of political unity, 
which was built in Europe by structuring/delimiting the political 
space over many waves between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries39, represents better than any other identitary system the 
bonds and meanings of political obligation. This kind of political 
unification had success also in facing the regional identitary 
challenges and claims.   
At this point it is possible to suggest a summary definition of 
territorial-political (and necessarily also cultural) identity that 
combines the elements mentioned above. A collective identity is 
political and it expresses group loyalty (political obligation) because 
it is based on individuals’ sense of belonging to the same group, a 
belonging characterized by:  
1.  an awareness of reciprocal recognition among group members 
and towards the group (as self-recognition and hetero-
recognition); 
2. a sharing of public-life aspects (history and memory, habits, 
rules and values, symbols and rites, social life practices); 
3. the availability of common resources (public goods, both 
material and symbolic); 
4. a sense of solidarity both reciprocal and towards the group that 
makes the distribution of citizenship benefits and costs 
acceptable to the group;  
5. a common legitimation of the command chain, its contents, its 
institutions and procedures; 
6. borders and criteria of inclusion in/exclusion from citizenship 
that delimit the group with respect to others;  
7. a shared territory (physically, legally and symbolically defined); 
8. a possibility for the group to reproduce itself and to persist 
over time and generations notwithstanding changes that may 
affect the group. 
 
The case of national identity fits perfectly with this definition 
of political-territorial identity. But this definition also marks a 
                                                     
39 From the large body of historiographical, political, sociological and anthropological 
literature on the topic see e. g. Hintze [1962; 1964]; Rotelli, Schiera [1972-1974]; Maravall 
[1972]; Eisenstadt, Rokkan [1973]; Rokkan [1999]; Tilly [1975b]; Schultze [1994]; Hermet 
[1996]; Reinhard [1999]; Krasner [1999].  
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“qualitative” difference between national and regional identity. 
This difference can be shown by identifying and clarifying what 
lies hidden beneath these two types of collective identity (national 
and regional). 
4. Politics, territory, identity: the paradigmatic case of Nation-State 
The concept of national identity concerns the self- and hetero-
recognition of a group as a Nation. Here “Nation” is used in a 
general sense to denote a human group, self-organized and self-
governed, that shares a political identity within a particular 
territory’s borders and maintains this identity and belonging over 
time (transmitting them from one generation to the next). 
According to this definition, “Nation” is a political concept that 
refers to the historical experience of the Nation-State; further, the 
Nation is the reference for movements that aim to make national 
identity and State coincide: that is, the coincidence of the sense of 
belonging with the legal, administrative, and coercive institutions 
of collective life organization. 
Usually, specialized studies emphasise that State and Nation 
should be kept distinct at both the analytical and empirical levels. 
There are good reasons for doing so, but this distinction is more 
questionable than appears at first sight. I say here only that in this 
context I prefer the notion of “Nation-State” to refer to the 
typical (but not the only) result of complex historical processes of 
formation of the (modern) State and Nation. 
When we use the term “Nation-State”, we refer to a pervasive, 
deep-lying, and enduring experience and mental category that 
have defined the world in which we live – even though they are 
not the whole of it. I shall summarize some salient aspects: 
a. the Nation-State is the most important and documented 
example of “political unity”; not by chance it has become the 
main field of studies on political development and political 
modernization [see e. g. Almond, Verba 1963; Organski 1965; 
Almond, Powell 1966; Pye 1966; Rustow 1967; Almond 1990; 
Rokkan 1999], a key element in historiographical, sociological, 
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and political narratives40, and the empirical referent (often 
implicit) for the concept of society41; 
b. the Nation-State is a historical phenomenon characteristic of 
the European political world and it extends beyond its original 
areas: it is an important factor in Weber’s “European 
uniqueness” of rationalization (in political-territorial 
organization spheres and with its economic, social, and cultural 
implications)42, that is to say, an essential component of the 
“European trajectory towards modernity” [see Therborn 
1995]; 
c. the Nation-State was the protagonist of, or at least the 
principal context for, the achievement of modern democracy 
and its citizenship system [see Marshall 1950; Bendix 1964; 
1978; Dahl 1971; 1990; Turner, Hamilton 1994; Linz, Stepan 
1996; Nevola 2007c]. 
 
But does the Nation-State still represent all this? Does it 
maintain its centrality in collective life? Or does it have, like any 
other historical phenomenon, a “life cycle” (birth, development, 
decline, death)? 
In the past twenty years, in concomitance with globalization 
and political events linked to 1989, the Nation-State is deemed to 
be in a crisis, or even dead, by public opinion and academic 
studies43. On this view, the Nation-State can no longer perform 
the functions that made it successful because it is challenged or 
eroded by globalization, the market economy and European 
integration, by regionalist tendencies or by local powers44. This is 
                                                     
40 I refer here to the large body of studies that reconstruct history using conceptual 
schemes centred on the Nation-State and to the political-science and sociological studies 
devoted to the most diverse aspects of social and political life (democracy, parties, the 
welfare State, the class structure, religious beliefs, and so on).  
41 This argument has been put forward, for example, by Giddens [1990]. The same line 
of inquiry has been pursued by political studies. See e.g. Freddi [1989]; Linz, Stepan [1996]; 
Fukuyama [2004]. That the Nation-State occupies a central position in political studies has 
also been confirmed in anthropology, although often in critical terms: See e.g. Geertz 
[1999]. 
42 See Weber 1922; see also, almost a century later, Mendras [1997].  
43 See e.g. McGrew [1992]; Guehénno [1993]; Omahe [1995]; Varoius Authors [1995]; 
Strange [1996]; Brubaker [1996]; Badie [1995; 1999]; Galli [2001]; Cassese [2002]; Cooper 
[2003]; Hobsbawm [2007]. For a different point of view see e. g. Dunn [1995]; Smith, 
Solinger, Topik [1999].  
44 From this perspective it is typically asserted that the Nation-State has been 
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supposed to be happening within the same Europe where the 
Nation-State was born and will finally die. From this derives the 
conviction concerning the fragility or increasing irrelevance of the 
national identity, and that it is not a resource but rather an 
obstacle against social development and the government and 
governance of collective life. 
This conclusion concerning the crisis or death of the Nation-
State is not new. Over the centuries various analysts and observers 
have argued that the Nation-State was in a crisis. And they were 
always wrong. And it seems to be the same today45. The thesis of 
the irreversible crisis, if not the demise, of the Nation-State seems 
to rest on fragile bases. 
National identity is still the primary form of political-territorial 
identity: this is demonstrated by the phenomenon of “national 
awakening” in the Western world and by the public debates that 
accompany it in the European countries and the USA (but also 
outside the Western area); and it is also shown by the paralysis, if 
not the regression, of European political integration and the 
failure of other projects for the supra-national federal unification 
of macro-areas46. In the “post-1989” world (and since 11 
September 2001), the return of a national form of collective 
identity/belonging, and its persistence despite prognoses of a 
post-national epoch, are undeniable on the factual level, beyond 
any judgement about its value47. The essential reasons as to why 
                                                                                                        
discredited by the two world wars of the first half of the twentieth century; that it dissolved 
during “les trentes glorieuses” of the second postwar period; and became an anachronistic 
and ineffective political space in comparison to social, economic and cultural realities: “too 
small to serve as an effective unit of coordination in an increasingly internationalized 
world, too large and remote to be a plausible and legitimate entity of identification” 
[Brubaker 1996, 2]. For a more meticulous, balanced, and multi-faceted analysis of these 
tendencies see Sassen [2006; 2007; Cofrancesco 2010]. 
45 The active role of the Nation-State and demands for its intervention in social and 
economic-financial life since 2001 and the financial crisis of recent years (demands made by 
the most diverse sectors of society and the economy) should be considered by even the 
most intransigent proponents of the demise of the Nation-State – also remembering that it 
has never been omnipotent. 
46 See on France Taguieff [1995a]; on the United States Huntington [2004]; on Italy 
Rusconi [1993]; Nevola [2003d]; on Germany Maier [1988]; Lepenies [1992]; for a 
comparative perspective Kellas [1991]; Smith [1995]; Grilli di Cortona [2003]; on European 
integration and its political-identitarian failure see Nevola [2007a]. See also notes 47 and 50. 
47 With reference to various phenomena and their analysis see: Mueller-Funk [1992]; 
Offe [1993]; Breton, Galeotti, Salmon, Wintrobe [1995]; Kupchan [1995]; Rupnik [1995]; 
Birbaum [1997]; Brabaker [1996]; Haupt, Mueller, Woolf [1998]; Cordellier, Poisson [1995]; 
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the Nation is still a protagonist have been summarized, among 
others, by Pierre-Andrè Taguieff48, who advances considerations 
which current political analyses usually overlook. Even if the 
crudity of Taguieff’s observations may be uncomfortable for a 
certain rhetoric of “political correctness”, it would be ingenuous 
or wrong on both political and analytical grounds to disregard 
them. Taguieff writes: Une identité collective existe à la condition 
de faire l’objet d’une croyance, de costituer la reference des gestes 
symbolique. Porquoi donc la collection d’humains s’identifiant 
comme “francais” manifeste-t-elle un “besoin” d’identification, en 
dépit des cours de boudoir des noveaux réformateurs de l’esprit 
public, s’efforcant de persuader celui-ci que désormais les cadres 
de l’Etat-nation sont devenus “trop étroits” pour résoudre 
efficacement les grands problems des societies post-industrielles, 
que les Etats sont condamnés à l’impuissance bavarde en raison 
des interdependences planétaires, et que c’est là un signe émis par 
le sens de l’Histoire? Et si l’identité francais, bien que notion 
indistinct, est une idée incarnée, incorporée, intériorisée, peut-il en 
aller de meme pour une identité supranationale telle que celle de 
l’Europe? Et les individus humains peuvent-ils se satisfaire 
d’appartenir sans médiation au genre humain? Car l’espéce 
humaine ne saurait constituer une communauté (politique ou 
culturelle), elle n’est qu’un concept classificatoire, et d’ordre 
zoologique. Une communauté, structure existentielle d’apparte-
nance, n’est ni une espéece (zoologiquement determine), ni un 
genre (moralment define). Bref, l’identité planétaire d’un individu 
humain demeure une fiction, expression pure d’un désir de type 
“océanique” (la fusion dans le Grand Tout). Rien ne doit bien sur 
interdire à nos contemporains de rever, et, par example, de 
s’enthousiarmer devant l’émergence d’une nouvelle utopia, celle 
de l’existence post-nationale des humains pacifique et 
départicularisés de l’avenir… Mais le doux reve du post-national 
parait n’Etre qu’une fragile compensation-écran, voilant la réalité 
                                                                                                        
Scharpf [1997]; Smith [1995]. See also notes 46 and 50. 
48 I would point out that Pierre-Andrè Taguieff, a careful scholar of racism, is a well-
known and declared anti-nationalist and anti-racist. See Taguieff [1987; 1995b]. He refers 
to the issue of French national identity, but it is entirely evident that his questions and 
intellectual provocations apply to the question of national identity in general. 
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hypernationaliste du monde qui semble advenir”49. 
In Taguieff’s argument we find a well-expressed position of 
political realism, as well as all the perplexity provoked by the 
thesis of the advent of the “post-national epoch”. But besides the 
anthropological-political element that Taguieff underlines, and 
beyond the return of the Nation and of patriotism, there are more 
specific tensions pushing for change that are present even within 
the most consolidated democratic societies, especially since the 
fall of Communism50. National belonging and identity are today 
the principal points of coalescence of such tensions, and at the 
same time they are delicate ideological resources (that is, political-
cultural mechanisms of “meaning” production) with which to 
subdue those tensions – resources that can be used politically for 
different purposes (from aggressive nationalism to constitutional 
patriotism). 
On considering the Nation as one (obviously not the only) 
source of identity and a sense of belonging to which communities 
still refer, it is easy to understand why the national question has 
returned to the agenda from its state of latency and repression, 
especially when a political community must deal with problematic 
change processes and challenges which threaten its cohesion and 
(social, economic, religious, cultural, territorial, political) balances, 
if not its very existence. The reference, of course, is to the 
situation of many Western democracies after the Cold War. 
Now briefly discussed are some of the principal changes and 
crisis factors that have entered the international stage since 1989 
(and impacted on collective life in the Nation-States). Why and 
how the phenomena described below fuel the return of the 
Nation are easily understandable for the reader, although each of 
these phenomena should require more details51: 
                                                     
49 Taguieff [1995a, 131-32]. See also Lemberg [1964]; Smith [1995]; Nevola [2002]. Of 
course, also the “post-national” utopia is not an entirely new notion. Nor does it imply that 
anything utopian is by definition of little value or uninfluential in social life. The concept of 
“community” used here by Taguieff relates to the one formulated by Weber [1922]. 
50 Significant studies on the problem of national identity in other European countries 
are, for example: Habermas [1990]; Birbaum [1992]; Greenfeld [1993]; Brubaker [1992]; 
two extensive thematic sections in Les Temps Modernes [608, 2000] and in Political Quarterly [1, 
2000] respectively devoted to the French and British cases. See also the references at notes 
46 and 47.  
51 The references that follow, with no claim to completeness, indicate analyses that 
help clarify phenomena and issues that stand in the background to my discussion but can 
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a. The fall of the Soviet Union and of its imperial structure, and 
the contemporary demise of communist doctrine, brought to 
the forefront nationalisms and micro-nationalisms that had 
been silent or invisible, first in central-eastern Europe, and 
then elsewhere. Similar phenomena have been due to the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, where very aggressive nationalisms 
have emerged. In this broad international context there came 
about the sudden re-unification of Germany, which implied, 
among other things, an acceleration of critical reflection on 
German identity and a push towards a renewed national self-
consciousness [see e.g. Various Authors 1991; Nahayho, 
Swoboda 1990; Garton Ash 1992; Cviic 1993; Waldenberg 
1994; Rupnik 1995; Brubaker 1996; see also notes 47 and 50]; 
b. The economic-financial and communication globalization 
processes, with the freedom of capital movements, the de-
materialization of wealth and its tendency to escape the fiscal 
regimes of individual states, has put the bonds of national 
belonging under strain, starting with the fragile mechanisms of 
collective solidarity represented by the welfare of a political 
community. But there is also the opposite trend represented by 
forms of “particularism”, a search for local roots and genuine 
specificities. Between the two extremes of globalism and 
localism the Nation-State is once again called into question: 
either because it is clamped in the vice of “glocalism” or 
because it is re-valued as a point of political-democratic 
balance between macro- and micro-belongings [see e. g. 
Guhénno 1993; Held 1995; Omahe 1995; Smith 1995; Clark 
1997; Geertz 1999; Beck 1997; 2002; Bauman 2000; 2001; 
Baldassarre 2002; Sassen 2006; 2007]; 
c. The process of European integration, and its limits, strongly 
recalls the traditional role and physiognomy of the Nation-
State, as well as the consistency of the sense of national 
identity/belonging of citizens with respect to the European 
sense. Besides the difficulties that European integration has 
encountered in the post-Maastricht period, there is an evident 
resurgence of political will in defence of “part positions”, 
national in this case; or the persistent strength of national 
                                                                                                        
only be alluded to here. 
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belonging/identity with respect to the European one. Finally 
apparent is a revaluation of the Nation-State as a political-
institutional space of democracy due to the “democratic 
deficit” of the European Union [see e. g. Habermas 1991; 
Haller, Richter 1994; Grimm 1994; Rusconi 1996; Dahrendorf 
1997; Banchoff, Smith 1999; Schmitter 2000; Nevola 2001a; 
2001b; 2007a]; 
d. The immobilism into which the European integration process 
lapsed after Maastricht and following introduction of the euro, 
on the one hand, and political-military conflicts and 
international terrorism on the other, came after the end of the 
bi-polarized world. It revealed the irreducibility of the logic of 
“national security and interest” and forced individual Nation-
State s to establish urgently and clearly their national political 
interests and their geopolitical roles. In this frame, the war 
scenarios revived the issues of patriotism and national political 
loyalty [see e. g. Huntington 1996; Portinaro 1996; Clark 1997; 
Panebianco 1997]; 
e. Migrations (intra-European and extra-European), with their 
disruptive and complex effects, lead to give new attention to 
the Nation-State borders (within the same European Union 
common space) as well as forcefully raise the issues of inter-
cultural relations, inter-ethnic cohabitation, multiculturalism, 
communitarianism, and the meaning of national 
belonging/identity [see e. g. Various Authors 1990; Taylor 
1992; Bonazzi, Dunne 1994; Crespi, Segatori 1996; Kymlicka 
1995; Sartori 2000; Kimlicka, Opalski 2001; Banting, Kimlicka 
2006; Todorov 2008; Moisi 2009]. 
 
The Nation is a source (clearly not the only one) of a sense of 
belonging and identity on which political communities draw. It is 
therefore evident why the national question arises especially 
during critical periods for a political community (when, for 
example, it has to deal with changes and challenges that may affect 
its balance or its existence itself). This is the situation in which the 
majority of Western democracies today find themselves. 
Notwithstanding these manifestations of national-identitary 
“revival”, however, many analysts argue that the existence of a 
“national revival” does not signify that Nations exist; and they 
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counsel against reifying the “Nation” [see e. g. Brubaker 1996]. To 
be sure, national identity is a “construct”. The Nation-State is a 
historical product, and the Nation is “imagined”; but this is the 
case of all identities, as well as all the phenomena of our lives. But 
others are the points that we should be stress:  
1. once identities “exist”, they produce consequences: they shape 
attitudes and behaviours, they become “realities”; 
2. the “reality” of identities depends on the modalities and 
success of their formation processes, and on certain 
conditions. What about these last conditions? 
 
Political science and historical-sociological studies on the 
political development and Nation-States building have shown the 
multiple factors that underlie the formation of political-territorial 
collective identities: economic-industrial and financial structures, 
strategies of interest groups, political and juridical institutions, 
coercive mechanisms, military organizations, communicative 
networks, cultural agencies, etc. They propose various 
combinations of these dimensions, occurring in different phases, 
during the construction of the Nation-State [see Deutsch 1953; 
Etzioni 1965; Bendix 1964; Almond, Powell 1966; Pye 1966; 
Lipset, Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1968; 1969; 1971; 1975; 1981; 
Rokkan, Urwin 1983; Tilly 1975b; 1990; Anderson 1983; Gellner 
1983; De Swann 1988; Breully 1993; Hermet 1996; Wehler 2001]. 
But all of them recognize that the cultural dimension (or better, 
the political-cultural one) plays a central role. As Charles Tilly 
summarized [see Tilly 1975a], during the formation of the Nation-
State almost all European governments took action to 
“homogenize” their populations as regards religion, ethnic and 
cultural minorities, a national language, and a public system of 
mass education. Governments that did not take such action, or 
failed to accomplish it, gave rise to very fragile and precarious 
Nation-States, as happened typically in south-eastern Europe. In 
other words, they failed with the politics of identity, and this failure 
generated major problems with national identity (and 
consequently for the Nation-State).  
The cultural success of the political identity of the Nation-State 
and its elites can be considered on various levels:  
1. the cultural homogenization of social norms, behaviour 
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expectations, symbols and values, beliefs, collective and public 
rites, customs and traditions [see Elias 1939; Tilly 1975a; 
Rokkan 1975; Smith 1991; 2008; Hermet 1996; Thiesse 1999];  
2. the linguistic unification based on a synthesis between 
vernaculars and “court national language”: this synthesis took 
the place of vulgar Latin (often metabolized as a “substrate”) 
and gave origin to the different national languages (of 
Romance/neo-Latin, Germanic or Celtic stock) [see Rokkan 
1975; De Swann 1988; Hermet 1996; on more strictly linguistic 
aspects see Auerbach 1948; 1958]; 
3. the creation of a unitarian network of communicative 
infrastructures able to connect individuals and groups 
previously scattered among physical and communicative 
territories – the “local spaces” of the emerging Nation-State 
[see Deutsch 1953; De Swann 1988]; 
4. the programs of compulsory elementary education geared to 
training workers and/or citizens for the tasks required by work 
(especially in industry) and/or by the political system 
(especially the democratic one), whose effects were the onset 
of social mobility and political participation by worker-citizens, 
enlargement of the labour force and the consensus sought by 
economic and political entrepreneurs [see De Swann 1988; 
Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hermet 1996]; 
5. the promotion of a political culture and identification with the 
Nation to be realized through a “struggle for recognition” led 
by a central political authority against the peripheral or local 
ones (churches, princedoms, local communities, elites etc.), as 
well as through multiple political culture channels (including 
public rites), both for the mass and for the élite [see Rokkan 
1975; Rokkan, Urwin 1983; Smith 1991; Hermet 1996; Thiesse 
1999; on individual national cases see e. g. Mosse 1974; 
Vovelle 1976]. 
 
The political-identitary project pursued by the élites of the 
Nation-State on the way to unification, and activated through the 
channels of political culture, political socialization and the 
educational system, developed through various phases. 
As well known, this project was never entirely peaceful 
because it always had to overcome numerous opponents: 
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churches, local seigniories, peripheral elites and communities, 
sometimes the working-class movement itself. But above all, the 
project almost never achieved complete or absolute political-
cultural integration in regard to certain important aspects 
(especially linguistic and religious). The continuing presence of 
strong ethno-cultural and linguistic minorities, of local-regional 
identities and loyalties, throughout most of the history of Nation-
States reveals the incompleteness of the integration. The historical 
persistence of these phenomena shows that the central authority 
of the Nation-State, and in parallel national identity/loyalty, have 
been questioned or rejected – in many cases until the present 
day52. 
The politics of identity and the national identity are essential 
components of a society’s political culture. According to a 
definition widely used in the social sciences (however 
unsatisfactorily) [see Almond 1960; Almond, Verba 1963; 
Almond, Powell 1966; for a critique see Caciagli 1988; Allum 
1988], a political culture consists of a set of individual attitudes 
predominant in a given population. A political culture is a sort of 
“social machine” whose possible outcome is legitimation of the 
political system to which it belongs. Political legitimation, in fact, 
is also based on the fact that individuals identify with the political 
community to which they feel that they belong. From this derives 
the support that they provide to the political community 
represented by the Nation-State, with its borders (territorial, 
political, cultural, juridical and symbolic) and its authoritative 
process of self-government. For these reasons, success in 
formation of the Nation-State, its persistence, and its good 
functioning, depend not only on the quality, efficiency and 
effectiveness of its political institutions but also on the capacity of 
its political culture to maintain a sense of belonging to it – that is, 
a national identity [see Linz 1995; Nevola 2007c]. 
On the basis of these considerations we may say, summarizing, 
that the concept of Nation-State refers to a human group 
                                                     
52 For overviews or analyses of individual cases see: Smith [1991]; Rokkan, Urwin 
[1983]; Tiryakian, Rogoski [1985]; Connor [1994]; Williams, Kofman [1989]; Rex [1995]; 
Haupt, Mueller, Woolf [1998]; Grilli di Cortona [2003]; Caciagli [2003]; De Winter, Tuersan 
[1998]; Gourevitch [1979]; Hechter [1975]; Minahan [2002]; Newman [1996]; Seiler [1994]; 
Smith [1981]. On the extreme case of secession see Williams [1982]; Nevola [1998].  
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organized on a territory that shares a sense of collective identity 
and belonging founded on shared history, cultural heritage, 
authoritative norms and interests; that reproduces and remoulds 
its identity/belonging over time, transmitting it from one 
generation to the next; and that is characterized by self-
recognition and hetero-recognition. In other words, a Nation-
State is a political-cultural community marked by a collective 
identity/belonging, by an authoritative system of self-government, 
by loyalty and political obligation. 
The Nation-State is, moreover, a “thought-out ordering”, that 
is to say, a “defined representation” that identifies a collectiveness 
of men with a unity [see Lepsius 1982] and as such it (and then 
the national identity) can be characterised (“thought out”) with 
identitary contents combined to varying extents. As it is known, 
political thought and the social sciences have highlighted different 
conceptions of the Nation and national identity using a variety of 
constitutive characters with an “objective” nature (language, 
religion, territory) or a “subjective” one (perception or awareness 
of belonging to a political community). On these bases, several 
classifications and typologies of national identities and “modalities 
of being a Nation” have been formulated. These diverse 
conceptions of the Nation can be grouped into a few principal 
“families” consolidated for (at least) two centuries by political 
thought and then revisited by the social sciences: the ethnic or 
ethno-cultural Nation (volksnation), the cultural Nation, the civic-
political Nation (or citizens’ Nation), the Nation as constitution 
(constitutional or republican patriotism). Ultimately, identifying 
the Nation (or a Nation) in one way or another depends on what 
Rainer M. Lepsius called the “criteria for the determination” of 
national collectiveness used in a in the conception of the Nation 
[see Lepsius 1982]. These criteria are established with the 
important contribution of intellectuals, élites, political movements 
and common people, over long historical periods, routinely or at 
particular and accelerated critical conjunctures of collective life. 
These criteria, moreover, are tools and stakes for the political 
identitary struggle (in particular on the side of the struggle for 
political-cultural “hegemony” (to recall a concept of Antonio 
Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu). Also through these processes 
Nation-States and national identities tend, in the case of success, 
 41 
to settle, to “objectivise themselves” until they become “national 
facts”. The diversified family of nationalistic movements (with 
their ideologies, languages, symbols, political actions) is not only 
and always the architect of these “national facts”; it is also a 
revealing factor of them. 
5. The structuring of political space between centre and peripheries: Nation-
State and the persistence of territorial cleavages 
The historical success of the Nation-State and its identitary 
configuration should not cause a misunderstanding. The historical 
process of State-building and national integration has been very 
difficult, painful, and almost never peaceful. In the main cases, 
even within the European elective area, many attempts to build a 
Nation-State have failed: after the First World War, for example, 
only thirty of the thousands of “political-statual” units that had 
existed in Europe during the fifteenth century still did so (e pluribus 
pauci, one might say) [see Tilly 1975a; see also Spruyt 1994]. In the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there were still alternative forms 
and natures that a political unit could assume. Besides the modern 
State (then national) that subsequently prevailed, there were 
arrangements such as the political federation (more or less 
coordinated by a centre); the empire (weakly controlled by a 
centre); the Christian republic (kept unified by the Catholic 
Church); the commercial city (especially in northern Italy and in 
Germany); an extensive network of commercial units (with no 
central political organization: this being the case of the Hanseatic 
League); the “feudal” system (then disappearing) [see Tilly 1975a; 
Grilli di Cortona 2003]. These alternatives to the Nation-State 
have failed for numerous reasons: they were unable to bind and 
control a territory; they were unable to centralize power, law and 
administration; they were unable to create specific instruments of 
governance different from any other organization; they were 
unable to standardize communication and transitional instruments 
(such as currency, units of measurement, language); they were 
unable either to monopolize or to centralize the system of 
resources extraction (taxes); they were unable either to 
 42 
monopolize or to concentrate the coercive system (use of force, 
the army); they were unable to build a single shared cultural 
identity able to transform itself into loyalty or political obligation 
and thereby yield legitimization. In sum, they failed the “political 
unification test”, and they then surrendered to the political 
organization form of the Nation-State [see Nevola 2007a]. 
During its enterprise of multi-dimensional structuring the 
political unit, the Nation-State had to overcome the resistance of 
many opponents (sometimes themselves constituted as political 
unities) until it absorbed them: princedoms, free cities, a variety of 
kingdoms, élites and peripheral communities. The historical 
processes that operated in these genetic phases of the Nation-
State, and in projections during later centuries, are those that 
come under the heading of relations between “centre” and 
“peripheries” [see Rokkan 1999; Grilli di Cortona 2003], or rather 
“internal colonialism” [Hechter 1975]. Behind the patterns of the 
relations between the “centre” and the “peripheries” lies the 
reality of persistent cleavages within the Nation-State, as well as 
the Nation-State’s efforts to remove them. These are in particular 
the “territorial cleavages” (or better “political-territorial” ones). As 
emphasised by Stein Rokkan, territorial cleavages raise bigger 
obstacles than functional ones against construction of the Nation-
State. Territorial cleavages may even lead to war, secession or 
deportation of entire populations [see Rokkan 1975]. They must 
be kept to the minimum for the successful formation and 
maintenance of the Nation-State; and the peripheries need to be 
kept under the control of the centre (even if this control may 
differ in form and intensity)53. 
                                                     
53 Various factors, in an “extraordinary historical synchronism” (between the end of 
the fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth), contributed to the success of the 
“unifying centre”. In the synthesis formulated by Rokkan, “first of all the development of 
the literate bureaucracies and legal institutions, largely through the cooperation of the 
Church with the Dynasties of the conquest centers; second, the growth of the trade and the 
emergence of new industries, developments which allowed the military-administrative 
machineries to expand without destroying their resource basis; and third, the emergence of 
national script and the consequent attempts to unify the peripheral territories culturally 
around a standard medium of internal communication: this development was pushed one 
step further at the Reformation, through the break with the cross-territorial Latin culture, 
and was accelerated through the invention of printing, through the multiple reproduction 
of messages without relays” [Rokkan 1975, 597]. On language see in particular also De 
Swaan [1988].  
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The last phase in the formation of the Nation-State is the 
“nationalization of the masses”, the inclusion of the populace in 
political life and mass democratization54. At this point, if the 
process has succeeded, national identity acquires the features of a 
mass political culture, and eventually a liberal-democratic one as 
normally understood. In regard to this complex historical-political 
process I would emphasise at least one aspect, given its 
implications for the topic at hand: the possibility that such a 
political identitary culture develops does not depend solely on 
coercion or economic factors (even if they are essential); it 
requires the presence of a “political will” supported by a certain 
degree of consensus. Here, especially in the long run, the Nation-
State formation has to acquire legitimation; alongside these 
processes, a certain degree of cultural communion among people 
reveals its importance55. 
However, we should not overvalue the cultural (ideological, 
economic) homogenization usually achieved by a Nation-State. 
The historical and empirical evidence is clear in this regard. 
Moreover, we should be careful not to equivocate. Despite the 
apparent homogeneity suggested by the expression, “Nation-
State” refers properly to a complex and diversified political 
construct. One of the main sources of this internal variety is the 
plurality/diversity of the territories that have been unified into the 
political territory of a Nation-State, and therefore the 
heterogeneity of the communities settled on those different (local) 
territories historically involved in the process of national political 
integration56. On these bases, the national identity itself results 
                                                     
54 See Dahl [1971]; Rokkan [1999]. On the non-democratic variant of mass 
nationalization, and specifically on the German case, see Mosse [1974]; more in general 
Mazower [1998].   
55 This has been argued even by scholars who tend to privilege force as a factor in the 
formation of the Nation-State, if nothing else because the presence of a culturally 
homogeneous population reduced the costs of State formation: it makes more feasible to 
uniform the administrative arrangements, encoures the loyalty and solidarity of the subject 
population to the sovereigns, makes easier the functioning of the communication systems 
[see Tilly 1975a]. The weight of this cultural dimension is also recognized by those who 
have such cultural exigencies (promoted by the social elites) depend on the structure and 
the interests of the industrial-capitalist economy: see Gellner [1983]; Hobsbawm [1994]. 
On the importance of political will, even more than of economic interests, see Hermet 
[1996]. On the connection between collective identity and legitimation in democracy see e. 
g. Eisenstadt [1999]; Scharpf [1997]. 
56 As Rokkan [1999] has stressed in regard to the history of the European geopolitical 
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from a sort of assemblage, which may or may not be successful, of 
several different elements57. A “monochromatic” Nation-State is 
an ideal-type which can be used for analytical explanation and 
speculation, but not for empirical description. It can even be 
argued that the Nation-State often has a “plural-national” nature 
[see Linz 1995]. This typical condition of the Nation-State has 
important implications not only for the institutional organization 
of the State [see Elazar 1987; Kellas 1991; Linz 1995; Lijphart 
1999] but also for the theme of national identity considered here. 
After 1989 the theory of the “end of territory” [see Badie 
1995] became popular: globalization and its technical-
communicative implications seemingly entailed a de-territorialized 
world (in respect to economy, politics, culture, habits and life-
style). But this vision is rather abstract [see Sassen 2007]. It 
mistakes some tendencies widespread among some social classes 
or some élites for a general pattern. De-territorializing has never 
been either a rooted or a general phenomenon in “real” collective life 
almost anywhere in the world. Once again it has been politics that 
has given visibility to a reality on which neoliberal-postmodern 
thought equivocated. In this specific case the reference is to the 
entry on the political stage of various movements linked to the 
territory and their growing political and electoral success, in 
particular certain movements with a nationalist, micro-nationalist 
or “regionalist”, ethno-regionalist orientation. 
But this is not all (as we shall see later). In recent years some 
analysts have talked of the “re-territorialization of politics” [see 
Grilli di Cortona 2003; Sassen 2006; 2007; for Italian case see e. g. 
Diamanti 1993; 1996; Huysseune 2006]. This notion, or better the 
notion of “(re-)politicization” of territory introduces a change in 
the view of politics dominant in the past three decades. Bearing 
this in mind, a first question is whether we are witnessing a real 
“return” of “sub-national territories nationalism” and of 
“regional” micro-nationalism, or whether we are witnessing only 
the persistence of a phenomenon over short periods in which it 
disappears or is latent58. 
                                                                                                        
area, the variance of the territories unified by the Nation-States is a valuable source for the 
study of politics. 
57 I have elsewhere treated this topic in regard to Italy: see Nevola [2003e].   
58 For the twentieth century see Mazower [1998].  
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I raise this question because during the 1960s and 1970s 
analysts emphasised the awakening of sub-national or regional-
nationalisms, that is, “ethnical revival” or “ethnical-nationalism” 
[see Smith 1981; Kellas 1991; Connor 1994]: Scottish, Welsh, Irish 
(within the United Kingdom); Corsican, Breton, Occitan (within 
France); Catalan, Basque, Galician (within Spain); Flemish, 
Walloon (within Belgium); South-Tyrolean (within Italy). In the 
1960s these phenomena were surprising, as they are more or less 
so still today. But are they really surprising? Analysis of the 
formation processes of the Nation-State suggests that they are 
not, and the nature of what we can call the “regional fact” suggests 
likewise. 
As shown by politological, sociological and historiographic 
studies on transformations in the Nation-States, the different 
national experiences of political unification have not completely 
healed territorial cleavages (in their economic-functional, socio-
cultural or political-institutional aspects). In fact, the problem of a 
distinct regional form of territorial “politicity” is still present [see 
Caciagli 1988; 2003; Rokkan, Urwin 1982; 1983; Horowitz 1985; 
Williams, Kofman 1989; Chisholm, Smith 1990; Haupt, Mueller, 
Woolf 1998]. A useful analytic approach to this question is the 
one based on the notion of “political culture”. This approach 
views “local counter-cultures” (or regional political sub-cultures) 
as variously organized forms of “resistance” against the 
centralizing action of the Nation-State [see Rokkan 1999; Caciagli 
1988]. This “resistance” is not just a reflection of the past. I shall 
now consider the other face of the territory’s importance for 
identity phenomena: the “regional face”. 
6. Some observations on the regional identity question 
The “regional phenomenon” has attracted renewed attention 
since the 1990s [see e. g. Schiera 1993; Harvey 1994; Haupt, 
Mueller, Woolf 1998; Perulli 1998; Caciagli 2003; Various Authors 
2005]. Long the last twenty years it has flourished within a context 
different from that of the 1960s. The course of European 
integration, geopolitical disruption within Eastern Europe, the 
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globalization process (as the opening of economic markets and 
the revolution in communication systems), migration waves to 
European countries (but also to the United States): all these have 
linked more strongly than in the past the “regional question” to 
the question of the Nation-State’s crisis and increasing 
“democratic unease” [see Nevola 2007b] – a “malaise” that sees 
public disillusion with the typical institutions of national 
representative democracies (traditional parties, parliament, 
government) and the success of neo-populist or anti-party 
movements [see e. g. Lasch 1995; Canovan 1999; Taggart 2000; 
Mény, Surel 2000; 2002; Betz 2004; Laclau 2005; Lukacs 2005; 
Taguieff 2007]. 
The “fait regional” (the sub-national one in which we are 
interested) is manifest in three main interrelated aspects: region, 
regionalization, and regionalism. 
1. THE REGION. Adequate understanding of a national society, 
as we know, also depends on its territorial organization59, 
whether this latter rests on economic-structural differences of 
capitalism and its social formations, pluralism and linguistic-
literary richness, the diversification of political culture and of 
the civic-associative fabric, the variety of electoral behaviours 
and tendencies in which the motley nature of democratic 
politics is apparent. Like many concepts with political valence, 
that of the region is difficult to define univocally. But even if 
somewhat vague [see Rost, Stoelting 2005], it usually refers to 
collective life spaces of intermediate size between “small-scale” 
(local or micro-regional) and “large-.scale” (world regions). In 
our case the concept refers to collective life contexts 
characterized by a variable homogeneity (political, economic, 
cultural, linguistic, climatic) embedded within a higher-level 
unit, like the Nation-State, and depending on the latter in 
important respects. These are contexts that often present some 
political-administrative aspects (or claim them). This political-
administrative aspect is sometimes quite weak (as in the case of 
a unitary-centralistic type of Nation-State, France for example); 
sometimes it is very strong (as in the case of a federal Nation-
                                                     
59 For an analysis of the Italian case, with the focus on the numerous dimensions of 
territorial variety, see Coppola [1997].  
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State, like Germany or the United States); while the majority of 
cases lie between these two extremes (like Italy, Spain, the 
United Kingdom). The intensity of this political-administrative 
aspect may change over time because of a variety of processes 
that are ultimately political. Interpreted in this way, the concept 
of region has a quite broad denotation that includes the 
“historical region” (usually associated with ethnic bonds), but 
does not end with it. In other words, “region” can have a 
political-administrative denotation or a social-cultural one 
(sometimes they coincide). In the former case, a region is the 
“largest political-administrative unit” within the Nation-State; 
in the latter, a region coincides with “a territory that hosts a 
collectivity with a distinctive identity” [Caciagli 2003, 15-16]. 
Yet regions are not “natural realities”; they too are, obviously, 
“constructed” historically, socially, politically, and culturally. 
Once again, we have a cultural and political “invention” [see 
Hobsbawm, Ranger 1983], and this holds regardless of 
whether or not “existing regions” are based on “authentic” 
historical traditions, whether or not they are of recent 
development, and whether or not they have originated from 
the simply existence of an administrative boundary [see Rost, 
Stoelting 2005] – although all these aspects may produce 
differences among the features of existing regions. Leaving 
aside epistemological discussion on the “reality status” of 
historical-political phenomena, here it is once again of 
importance to focus on “regions as inventions”. Put briefly, 
what is relevant here is that, over time, the “invented regions” 
– or at least some of them – have become “objective” and 
“institutionalized” (in the sense explained by sociological 
theories)60. It has thus happened that even the most “artificial” 
regions have consolidated and become institutionalized within 
collective imagery, political culture, political-administrative 
practice, and sometimes even the everyday life-practices of 
                                                     
60 See on this the seminal studies by Durkheim, Weber, Schütz or Gehlen. For a theory 
on how social phenomena become “objectified”, and which also assumes the perspective 
of action and the actor  where reality is “socially constructed”, see Berger, Luckmann 
[1966]; for a more recent resumption and reformulation of this view of social phenomena 
see Berger, Luckmann [1995]. 
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citizens61. In sum, transmitted from one generation to the next 
as “spaces of collective life” characterized by a certain 
relational density, even some of the most artificial regions have 
become “realities” – social realities, that is, political-territorial 
contexts. In other words, they have become elements of 
collective memory, definite containers of events and characters, 
myths and stereotypes. Regions tend to produce, reproduce 
and project their identities. Sometimes regions are replete with 
history and politics, sometimes they are less so. Moreover, they 
differ by their levels of internal integration or of external 
“recognition” (or “weight”). Besides these differences, the 
“existence” of a “regional identitary fabric”, consisting of 
cultural elements, economic interests, powers, and inertias, is 
the reason why it is so difficult to reconfigure “regional 
spaces” (both at national and European level). 
2. REGIONALIZATION. The notion of “regionalization” 
relates to the promotion of regions and regional identities. 
Usually, this is a top-down process that develops through 
reforms undertaken by the Nation-State so that some 
functions and competences are devolved to regional 
administrations. The process also entails the increased value of 
territorial criteria in the organization of interests, and in 
political choices [see Smith 1985; Caciagli 2003; Rost, Stoelting 
2005]. As well known, in the past twenty years Europe has 
seen an increase in regionalization due to pressures applied by 
local élites, the claims of regional movements, the need to 
reform State governance, and incentives from the European 
Union. 
3. REGIONALISM. The term “regionalism” has various 
meanings. Here regionalism is taken to be a political-cultural 
process in which a collectivity with a sense of territorial 
belonging takes action, or an élite mobilizes and organizes the 
cultural, economic, and political interests of a territory [see 
Brunn 1995; Caciagli 2003]. After being considered for several 
centuries a regressive ideology typical of laudatores temporis actis, 
which the proponents of modernization opposed, regionalism 
obtained political-cultural dynamism in the 1960s and 1970s, 
                                                     
61 This is the case, for example, of certain Italian regions.  
 49 
and then over the past twenty years. Regionalism seemed 
initially to be the ideology of marginalized backward regions 
exploited by the “centre” (“internal colonialism”), but it soon 
became the badge of the richest and most developed regions 
(as in the cases of Catalonia, Lombardy, Veneto or Flanders)62. 
The most visible incarnations of regionalism are political or 
ideological movements, sometimes outright political parties, 
predicated on territorial identity and interests, and advancing 
historical-cultural, political and economic claims. In some cases 
such movements openly reject the Nation-State’s authority by 
claiming not only cultural and administrative recognition but 
also political autonomy, federalism, or even separation (using 
violent or peaceful means) [see e. g. King 1982; Burgess 1986; 
Elazar 1987; Chisholm, Smith 1990; Buchanan 1991; Twining 
1991; Burgess, Gagnon 1993; Tullock 1994; Miglio, Barbera 
1997; Nevola 1997b; Coppieters, Huysseune 2002]. 
 
Although it may happen that radical forms of regional 
identitary movements dispute the political national identity, the 
latter and regional identity are not necessarily in conflict with each 
other63. This observation backed by a tendency apparent at the 
political level. That is to say, when the most extreme expressions 
of regionalism raise the questions of the self-determination and 
self-government of regional communities, and consequently claim 
recognition as “new” Nation-States, the political movements or 
parties that embodied that claim almost never pass the “political 
unification” test or receive democratic legitimization according to 
electoral rules64. It is no coincidence that the idea of separation 
                                                     
62 For a map of regionalisms or regional micronationalisms and of ethno-regionalist 
movements in Europe see e.g. Luverà [1999]; Caciagli [2003]; Grilli di Cortona [2003]; 
Haupt, Mueller, Woolf [1998]; De Winter, Tuersan [1998]; Tronconi [2009]; Huysseune 
[2011].  
63 See, for example, the Italian case of the “special statute regions” in Nevola [2003e]; 
Woolf [2000].  
64 Exceptions to this general pattern, at least since the Second World War, have been 
the violent dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia and the peaceful one of 
Czechoslovakia. Instead, there have been no cases of the dissolution of mass liberal-
democratic regimes, notwithstanding the tensions in Canada (the case of Quebec), in Spain 
(with the Basque Country), in Belgium (with Flanders and Wallonia), in France (with 
Corsica) or in Italy (first with Sicily, then with the South-Tyrol/Alto Adige, finally with 
“Padania”). On the political unification test see Nevola [2007a]; on the problem of the 
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from the Nation-State hardly ever receives full support from the 
majority of the “regional population” (although this is difficult to 
measure). Nor is it a coincidence that secession, from the point of 
view of political realism, usually seems to be more a threat with 
which to obtain recognition and privileges than a real goal. 
7. On the “strength” of national identity 
Several studies have examined the impact of sub-national 
political culture on Nation-State cohesion. Some have argued that 
sub-national political cultures with an ethno-linguistic basis “used 
to provoke and will probably provoke more and more centrifugal 
pressures” [Caciagli 1988, 454]. Such sub-national cultures 
manifest certain types of political antagonism. However, history 
has shown that this antagonism has not always taken the form of 
radical and violent claims. This has been due in part to the 
repression, coercive integration and political-cultural socialization 
skills of the Nation-State. But it has also been due to the success 
of “recognition politics” between centre and peripheries. A 
collective identity is formed, in part, by “recognition, un-
recognition or misrecognition” by others [see Taylor 1992]; from 
this derives the political importance of the “struggle for 
recognition” in the formation processes of collective identities 
[see note 36], including political-territorial ones. What conditions 
may favor this reciprocal recognition?   
Firstly, for this reciprocal recognition between region and 
Nation-State to come about, it is important that there be 
appropriate political institutions able to regulate a plurality of 
collective identities. The regionalization of Nation-State 
structures, federal systems and consociational political systems in 
many cases satisfies the need for reciprocal recognition on 
political-institutional bases [see e. g. Horowitz 1985; Kellas 1991; 
Lijphart 1999]. These are experiences well-established in the 
Western democracies, even if in some cases tensions between the 
Nation-State and regional peripheries persist. Whether they are 
consolidated experiences or more recent tendencies, in several 
                                                                                                        
democratic legitimation of secessionist claims see Buchanan [1991]; Nevola [1998]. 
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cases, political arrangements of a regional, federal or 
consociational kind have been able to respond even to 
“centrifugal regionalism” [see Huysseune 2011], whose radical 
claims for self-government or independence sometimes hide a 
political strategy pursuing more moderate aims. It seems, for 
example, the case of the Lega Nord in Italy and its claims for 
autonomy on independence of “Padania”. 
Secondly, successful reciprocal recognition between the 
Nation-State and regional areas also depends on the role of the 
political elites: their behaviours and attitudes strongly influence 
the quality of national integration and the recognition of national 
and sub-national territorial identities [see Linz 1995]. 
Thirdly, political-institutional solutions and the attitudes of 
political élites must be sustained by a political culture that operates 
at mass level as well; a political culture able to create a feeling of 
“us”, of shared belonging to a national community, a common 
political identity. This political culture must in particular create a 
national identity able to contain the specific identities of the 
territories that form a Nation-State. 
Given these institutional, élite-politics and mass political 
culture conditions, some cases of centrifugal regionalism still exist: 
regionalism characterized by strong historical-cultural rootedness 
(often centered on language or on religion) and by radical claims 
(for self-government, political independence, control over 
economic and fiscal resources, identitary closure of the citizenship 
system). This is perhaps the case of Belgium. What prospects of 
success does this kind of regionalism have? 
In Europe, the past few years have seen the emergence of a 
thesis that views the “region” as a political-territorial and 
economic actor able to affirm its identitary centrality vis-à-vis the 
Nation-State. This has been due to the presumed surrender of the 
Nation-State and to the political malaise afflicting the national 
democracies. National politics have been discredited by 
corruption or by their failure to respond satisfactorily to citizens’ 
fears (economic crisis, unemployment, crime, immigration, 
cultural diversity). But this thesis of the identitary centrality of the 
region in comparison to the Nation-State is not convincing. It 
does not persuade when it implies that authoritative bonds 
(“political obligations”) should be shifted from the Nation-State 
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to the regional space. In this case, in fact, the region should 
acquire the political characteristics of a Nation-State, but the 
chances of this happening are very small. This identitary-territorial 
change of authoritative bonds would require demanding 
conditions and political resources very difficult for the actors 
seeking to achieve this goal to find. 
The thesis of the region’s identitary centrality rests on a 
perspective with a solid historical-political basis and, mostly, on 
the contingent and changing nature of political unification forms. 
But the crux of this view is that, in the current historical-political 
setting (especially in democracies), the “region” (or similar “sub-
national” as well as transnational aggregations) seem unable to 
pass the “political unification test”. Exceptions are the centrifugal 
phenomena of the Eastern Europe that arose from the 
communist system (examples are the former Soviet Union, former 
Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia); but as regards Western 
democratic Europe, Belgium is the only case to keep seriously 
under observation. 
What a “region” lacks is not a common political culture or a 
cultural identity (which are sometimes even stronger than those of 
the Nation-State) but a political identity: which is the translation 
of the collective identity into binding loyalty (“political 
obligation”). The relevance of political identity emerges mostly 
when multiple identities are exposed to “belonging conflicts”65. 
The Nation-State is still the political-territorial and symbolic space 
in which political premises and instruments are available to 
manage public problems authoritatively66: problems as economic 
                                                     
65 The perplexities in this regard concern not only the idea that the State-centric system 
has been superseded (given the supposed demise of the Nation-State), but also, and 
especially, the notion of a “stateless federalism” (à la Althusius). This perspective, in fact, 
risks leaving a “political vacuum” created by the presumed obsolescence of the Nation-
State. Indeed, according to Otto von Gierke [1880], sovereignty does not dissolve but is 
redefined in Althusius, especially with reference to Bodin’s doctrine. Were this not so, the 
“political vacuum” would swallow the functional imperatives of self-government and 
political obligation – associated with which is the need for any form of political community 
to possess its own criteria of “inclusion/exclusion” (definition of “who we are”) and of 
“obedience/disobedience” (definition of “who commands” and “whom to obey”) – 
criteria that have to do, in other words, with the definition of membership and 
“recognition” of the chain of command (of its procedures, institutions, and contents). 
66 “Authoritative” in the sense of being endowed with legitimate binding power erga 
omnes. See Easton [1953].  
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and financial crisis; employment and social protection; allocation 
of rights and duties of citizenship; political participation, 
representation and democratic pluralism; collective security and 
public order; management of international balances and crises. It 
is probably for this reason that citizens seem particularly attached 
to the Nation-State in comparison with other political-territory 
spaces. Consequently, neither can the notions of a “Europe of 
regions” or of “regionalization of the globalized space” challenge 
the Nation-State model. The centuries-long formation process of 
the Nation-State aids understanding of how its success lies in the 
strength and distinctiveness of its identitary system. This also 
explains why the Nation-State is able to respond to critical 
moments, when it proves able to draw on surprising resources in 
order to deal with identitary challenges. 
8. On the “value” of national identity 
The continuing centrality of the Nation-State and national 
identity also depend on the “good reasons” in their favor. These 
“good reasons” are linked to democracy viewed as a “political 
value” (or as a “meta public good”). 
Historically, the Nation-State has been the “container” of 
democracy, that is, the political space in which democratization 
has taken place. The Nation-State is obviously not the only 
historical container of democracy, but it has certainly been the one 
best equipped to develop mass liberal democracy and its 
“constitutive elements” [see Nevola 2007a]. This means not so 
much that the Nation-State is the only environment favourable to 
democracy as that the establishment and consolidation of a 
democracy take place in a political space that has already been 
“unified”. The type of political unity may change over time, but 
unification remains the necessary condition for democracy [see 
Dahl 1990; Linz, Stepan 1996; Nevola 2007a]. 
Democracy is, among other things, the acceptance of 
differences and divisions; it is freedom, pluralism and 
competition. The individuals and groups that form a democracy 
may divide and enter into conflict with each other but only once 
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they have defined “who they are”: in other words, after they have 
established themselves as the “we” that comprises the variety of 
ideas and interests sustained by those individuals and groups [see 
Rokkan 1999; Walzer 1983; Dahl 1990; Linz, Stepan 1996]. This 
close and virtuous interdependence between the “unified political 
space” (Nation-State) and the “pluralist political space” 
(democracy) does not concern solely the moment of genesis of a 
democratic system. The subsequent practice of democratic 
citizenship itself requires the precious resource of national identity 
so that it can be nourished and provide citizens with “benefits and 
rights” and allocate right and duties. This argument is related to 
the view of democratic citizenship as a “meta public good”; and 
like any other public good, democracy entails “costs and duties” in 
its production, allocation and distribution [see Nevola 1994a]. 
Within this theoretical framework we have to underline that a 
political community preserves its democratic integration and 
legitimation on the condition that it safeguards some essential 
factors of “civic co-living”: freedom of expression and 
neutrality/certainty of law; division and balance of powers; 
political equality, pluralism and representation; monetary transfers 
and services for a minimum level of well-being and social security 
[see Nevola 1994a]. These elements of “civic co-living” represent 
“benefits” for the citizens (the variety of rights and goods). But 
maintaining and nourishing the “benefits” provided by a 
democratic citizenship system requires that a political community 
must have members willing to assume the relative “costs”. In this 
case we refer to “costs” such as tolerance of diversity; lawful 
behavior and compliance with rules; political participation and 
democratic vigilance; taxation and voluntary work [see Nevola 
1994a]. When (or if) this balance between benefits and costs 
(rights and duties) is lacking, or comes under strong pressure, the 
survival of democracy is at risk, or it may decline in quality. On 
this view, the citizenship benefits/costs balance refers to a 
“critical threshold”: that is, it refers to minimum levels of citizen 
willingness to support the costs of civic-democratic cohabitation. 
Below this threshold, the allocation of the benefits and the 
conditions themselves for a political-democratic system are at risk. 
The problem of the “critical threshold” formulated in terms of 
costs/benefits and their balance shows that democracy possesses 
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a “utilitarian structure” for the production and allocation of public 
goods. However, “democratic utilitarianism” may sometimes be 
inefficient or ineffective, or at any rate unable to achieve the 
objective pursued. “Democratic authoritarianism” [see Almond, 
Powell 1966, 2th edition 1978] is an alternative to the democratic 
utilitarianism sometimes employed by democratic regimes. But 
there is a further resource that a democratic community can use 
before it resorts to solutions of “democratic authoritarianism”: it 
is precisely this resource that is denoted with the notion of 
“political identity”. By virtue of their “belonging resources”, 
groups and individuals assume costs and duties in the production 
of democratic citizenship which exceed their own benefits and 
rights: that is, they “pay” in terms of attitudes and conducts, time 
and money for others unable or unwilling to do so. An important 
role in such a situation is played by political identity and its 
dimensions: reciprocal recognition, loyalty, solidarity, trust, 
civicness67. 
The “sense of belonging”, as we know, may assume different 
features, some more “universalistic”, others more 
“particularistic”68. But one of its typical political (and usually 
territorial) forms is certainly the Nation-based one. This form has 
historically predominated in the Western world, at least in the last 
two or three centuries. The maturation or the deficit of a sense of 
national belonging consequently involve, positively or negatively, 
the sources (“virtues”) of “reciprocity” on which a political 
community can count to maintain the balance between costs and 
benefits (rights and duties) in the production and allocation of the 
public good represented by democratic citizenship69. 
But what is the specific feature to which the concept of national 
identity/belonging refers? National identity is a case of political 
                                                     
67 Eisenstadt [1999] has stressed the intimate connection among democracy, trust, 
collective identity and Nation.  
68 In the former case inspired by criteria regulating inclusion, such as, for example, 
agreement-aimed dialogical Diskurs, the “veil of ignorance” in “its original position”, the 
competences of rationality and argumentative neutrality, and human rights. See, 
respectively, Habermas [1981; 1992]; Rawls [1971]; Ackerman [1984]; Bobbio [1990]. In the 
latter case inspired, for instance, by criteria regulating territorial inclusion (the local 
community) or functional inclusion (the social class). See on the one hand, Shils [1993]; 
Etzioni [1995]; on the other, Parkin [1979]; Esping-Andersen [1985]. 
69 In this context it is useful to recall the concept of “civic virtues”. See e. g. Dagger 
[1997]. 
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identity on a territorial basis – a successful historical case that has 
prevailed over its territory-identitary rivals. Although a national 
identity requires the existence of “shared” elements (of various 
kinds), this does not entail that a national political community is 
necessarily “homogenous”, “totalitarian” or “exclusive”. Sharing 
and identification reflect the existence of a “connective texture” 
(socio-cultural, ethical-political, institutional, symbolic) resulting 
from “strings” of different colours. The role of such a texture is 
to hold together even pluralist and conflictual societies like the 
contemporary ones. In light of such recognition of the political 
pluralism it becomes decisive, when we talk about fatherland and 
Nation, to distinguish between a “democratic patriotism” and a 
“totalitarian patriotism”70. 
It is clear that not all Nation-States are democratic. Nor are 
they all fertile ground for democracy: in so far as they are 
successful political units, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for the birth and growth of democratic systems. Moreover, not all 
types of national identity prove to be fruitful resources for 
democracy. National identity may in fact assume, and has done so 
in history, different features. In the past as well as the present we 
find national identities that are closed, exclusive, monist, mono-
ethnic. These are national identities “dissonant” or “regressive” 
with respect to the principles of democratic pluralism. However, 
since the end of the XVIII century (see in particular the United 
States, France) an open and inclusive type of national identity has 
progressively imposed itself – also in regard to ethnic and cultural 
differences. This is the case of the so-called “civic-political” 
Nation, the “Nation of citizens” or “constitutional patriotism”. 
Despite its problems and its limitations, the Nation-State, with 
its political-identitary profile, has proved able to respond 
positively to the requirements of modern democracy. In many 
cases the Nation-State has also passed the democratization test. 
By contrast, the democratic test seems more problematic for the 
political project of radical independentist regionalism. 
                                                     
70 For a socio-political analysis of  the bonds of  patriotic identity and national 
belonging see the important and unjustly forgotten Grodzins [1956], which draws, with 
subtlety and a wealth of  examples, an original distinction between democratic patriotism 
and totalitarian patriotism with interesting implications for the most genuine meaning to be 
attributed to “constitutional patriotism”. See Nevola [2003c]. 
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Some regionalisms seek to give life to new political units 
through the separation of a regional area from the Nation-State. 
Opposed to the multicultural, multi-ethnic or multi-national 
features of the Nation-State, they emphasis their own particular 
identities characterized by cultural or ethnic homogeneity. If 
successful, this kind of regional claim would create political 
regimes failing the democracy test. It would do so because along 
this route there would emerge political regimes of “ethnocratic” 
type characterized by a total liberal-democratic deficit; or 
“ethnodemocratic” regimes characterized by a milder liberal-
democratic deficit. A further case still remains: that of 
regionalisms which seek to create new political units open to the 
many faces of democratic pluralism. But in this case their claims 
for self-determination and self-government cannot be coherently 
founded on solely ethnic or historical-cultural homogeneous 
bases. These would be regionalisms which put themselves forward 
as new democratic Nation-States on a smaller scale. This scenario 
poses the problem of the “dimensions” of the political democratic 
unit: a classic problem in both democratic history and doctrines 
(Johannes Althusius, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Madison) [see 
Dahl 1990]. 
Probably the best argument for the advocates of “small-scale 
democracy” is that, in small units, political processes are closer to 
citizens and it is possible to achieve a more immediate and solid 
collective solidarity. Even presuming that these positive aspects 
are welcome for the equality of a democratic system, they still 
entail other problematic aspects for collective life: fragmentation 
of the international system into numerous small units, which 
increases the likelihood of conflict; greater difficulties in the 
governance of international problems; the weakness of political 
units in their relationships with other units; low structural and 
functional differentiation of society; limits on the ability to 
produce public goods responding to the current standards of 
contemporary developed societies. Finally, the good principle of 
the proximity of citizens to the decision-making system can be 
realized within a federal arrangement as well. 
From all this derives a deficit of political identity and a certain 
“democratic ambiguity” in the regional alternative to the Nation-
State. And Nation-State persists in contemporary politics, 
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revealing to be the best option that citizens have in their hands 
when they look at organizing in a democratic way their public life. 
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Politics, Identity, Territory. 
The “Strength” and “Value” of Nation-State,
the Weakness of Regional Challenge
Gaspare Nevola
The post Cold War age reveals itself as being characterized mostly by the flourishing of “identity 
politics”. Identitary issues affect the public dimension of collective life and they often develop 
into economic, legal, political terms. There are many types of collective identity. We would clarify 
some of them in order to focus the analytical tools that are necessary to face the phenomena we 
are interested with: national and regional identities. Crucial in our argument are the concept of 
“political identity” and its “territorial” dimension. This concept and this dimension consent to 
compare Nation-State and (sub-national) region as space of collective life, and their “authoritative” 
degree. According to this subject this essay will treat the following points: the return of identity 
politics nowadays (section 1); the concept of collective identity (section 2); the many faces of 
collective identity (section 3); the relationship among politics, territory and identity, analyzed 
through the paradigmatic case of Nation-state and national identity (section 4); the structuring of 
political space between centre and peripheries, where we consider how the dominance of Nation-
State model  has to face persisting of territorial cleavages (section 5); the case of  the regional issue 
(section 6); the “strength” and the “value” of Nation-State (sections 7 and 8). 
Gaspare Nevola is professor of Political Science, Faculty of Sociology, University of Trento. He is 
member of the Board of the Doctoral School in Political Science, University of Pavia. His study 
areas include: political culture, identity and public rituals; transformation and legitimation 
problem of contemporary democracy; liberal and communitarian political theory; religion and 
politics in post-secular democratic society; political unification process. Among his publications: A 
Constitutional Patriotism for Italian Democracy, in «Bulletin of Italian Politics» (2011, forthcoming); 
The Territorial-Identitary Side of a Democracy, in M. Huysseune (ed.), Contemporary Centrifugal 
Regionalism, The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts (2011); Democrazia, 
Costituzione, Identità, Utet (2007); Il malessere della democrazia contemporanea e la sfida 
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